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The Necessity, Public Interest, and Proportionality in
International Investment Law: A Comparative Analysis
Abdulkadir GÜLÇÜR

Abstract
This article deals with relations of the three concepts of international investment law which can be enumerated as “necessity,”
“public interest,” and “proportionality.” These three concepts have
been reviewed in the light of the relevant investment tribunals’ decisions and judgments of other international judicial bodies. In democratic governments, legal acts and actions must be based on the
“public interest.” However, the “public interest” does not constitute
by itself a determinative factor for lawfulness. The proportionality
principle has a significant role in the investment arbitrations concerning whether the “public interest” aim is met. Albeit those inferences, the “public interest” claim is not a magic key which opens all
doors. Because even if such a claim is asserted, it will be insufficient
when some governmental actions are pursued to protect vital interests of the State. Hence, “state of necessity” always has been retained on the agenda of international law. Therefore, the customary
law had developed stringent requirements for meeting the conditions
of “necessity.”
Introduction
In modern international investment law, one of the major issues
is related to government actions, which can be regarded as tantamount to the expropriation of foreign investments. There is no doubt
that regulatory measures of the governments have specific value
whether such measures, for instance, are undertaken for protection of
public interests or the environment; and therefore, can be considered
as an expropriation that is economically justified.1 Economic analysis
Research Assistant and Ph.D. Candidate at Marmara University Faculty of Law, International Law Department. LL.B. (2013), Istanbul University Faculty of Law, LL.M.
(2017), Marmara University Institute of Social Sciences. I would like to thank eminent
scholar Dean Emeritus Professor Frank (Tom) Read (from South Texas College of
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of international law can be a useful tool for that determination. Besides, in necessity cases, economic analysis of law also is a decisive
factor concerning whether government fiscal policies have a negative
impact on economic exigency. In a series of Argentine cases, “International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes” (ICSID) tribunals reviewed that matter. Except for the LG&E v. Argentine Tribunal2, all of them accepted the contribution of government policies
to the financial crisis.
This article will show the boundaries of “necessity” and “public
interest” in order to demonstrate how the proportionality principle
would carry out its function in the disputes. There are several considerations and distinct theories capable of influencing the consequences. For this reason, it is quite important to examine the large number
sources which are included both in the jurisprudence, set by cases of
investment arbitration as well as the studies of eminent scholars.
Therefore, relevant decisions of ICSID tribunals and other international judicial bodies have been reviewed in the article. Furthermore,
particular attention has been paid to the inclusion of opposite views
in the doctrine and therefore, has been adhered to the dialectic process.
In Part 1, from the first modern arbitration practice in the socalled Neptune case to the Argentine cases which were brought to the
ICSID tribunals by American investors, the “necessity” defense of
States has been reviewed. Part 2 aims to reveal the intellectual background of “economic analysis of law.” That analysis provides contractual solutions to the disputes. The Russian Indemnity case is a historical and appropriate example of this approach. In terms of
investment law, determination of the investment definition usually
has been reviewed and criticized by the arbitral tribunals and scholars. One of the requirements of the investment definition, which was
developed by Salini Tribunal, is problematic. According to that re-

2.

Law) for his helpful comments on this article. I feel privileged to have participated in
Professor Read’s various courses about American law and tort law at Bahcesehir University from 2011 to 2017. His critiques have provided an inestimable contribution to
the article. I am also grateful to my mother, father, and brother for their valuable support and encouragement. All errors are solely my own. E-mails: akgulcur@gmail.com
and abdulkadir.gulcur@marmara.edu.tr 1. MATTHIAS HERDEGEN, PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, 363-364 (2013).
See, infra note 20.
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quirement, a foreign investment must provide a “contribution to host
State’s economic development.” That attitude also has a direct relationship with “economic analysis of law.”
Part 3 examines the “public interest” concept and its improvement in modern investment arbitration. Third-party submissions and
public participation to the cases have a possible impact on dispute
settlements. “Public interest” defenses of States are also observable
from cases concerning indirect expropriations related to regulatory
measures. For a deeper understanding of the balance between “public
interest” of States and legitimate expectations & rights of foreign investors, I allocated Part 4 for the principle of proportionality. The
proportionality principle shows up as different sources of international law under the “Article 38/1 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ),” as a “treaty provision” or as a “customary international law” rule or as a “general principle of law” depending on the
sub-branches of international law. In the sense of international investment law, proportionality principle is acceptable as a “general
principle of law” unless there is an existence of a provision in the relevant treaty, mostly in the bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
1.

The Necessity Defense in International Investment Law

1.1. The Neptune Case
Necessity is one of the oldest defenses of States which have done
a wrongful act under international law. The oldest dispute in the
modern arbitration practice regarding the “state of necessity” is the
Neptune case which was taken to the judicial body constituted under
the “Jay Treaty.” The “Jay Treaty” is a “Treaty of Amity, Commerce
and Navigation between Great Britain and the United States” signed
on November 19, 1794.3 The Jay Treaty set up three mixed commissions under articles 5, 6, and 7. Article 7 relates to the complaints of
American citizens who had suffered losses because of the illegal capture of their vessels during the maritime war between France and
Great Britain.4 The case of Neptune concerning seized vessels under
an order of April 1795 issued by the British government. The order
had instructions to the commanders of warships “to stop and detain
3.
4.

Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, Jay Treaty (1794), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (VOL. 1), 108 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1981).
Id. at 109.
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all vessels loaded wholly or in part with corn, flour or meal bound for
any port in France.”5 One of the seized vessels was Neptune which
was partly loaded with rice and had departed from Charleston to
reach to the port of Bordeaux. The vessel was brought to London, and
its cargo was sold to the British government under the supervision of
the high court of admiralty.6
The claimant demanded his possible profit if the cargo would
have reached Bordeaux. But the registrar and merchants acted under
the rule of order prescribed by the British government and allowed
only the invoice price together with a mercantile profit of 10 percent.
Thereupon the claimant applied to the board of commissioners under
“Article VII of the Jay Treaty” for compensation of his loss. The
British government defended itself claiming that, the capture was
lawful and must be considered as contraband of war. The board of
commissioners, by a majority vote, rejected the argument of the British government and accepted the compensation which was demanded
by the claimant.7
Commissioner Gore indicated that there is no “state of necessity”
for Great Britain, as defined by Grotius, which would justify the seizure of victuals belonging to neutrals.8 Another commissioner, Mr.
Pinkney, also defended that Grotius considered the right of seizure as
the indispensable means of self-defense, not as a means of reduction
of the enemy.9 He added a quotation from Grotius and defined “necessity” as a real and pressing condition not imaginary. But the
statements of the agent of Britain’s to the commission could not justify the requirements of necessity occurring in the facts of the dispute.10 Lastly, fifth commissioner Mr. Trumbull elaborated the issue
differently and specified that if the ship seized in the act of entering
or attempting to access a port where besieged or blockaded and
known by the neutral master, the capture would be considered as legal and regular under the law of nations.11 Like two other commis5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY,
VOL. 4, 3843 (1898).
Id.
Id. at 3844.
Id. at 3853.
Id. at 3859.
Id. at 3873.
Id. at 3878.
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sioners, Mr. Trumbull thought that “necessity must be absolute and
irresistible and until all other means of self-preservation shall have
been exhausted,” the seizure of goods “can be justified by the plea of
necessity.” Therefore, he concluded that “the claimant suffered loss
and damage by irregular and illegal capture.”12
State practice and judicial decisions demonstrate that the necessity defense only precludes wrongfulness under strict requirements.13
According to Article 25 of the “ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States,”14 the necessity defense is only acceptable under the two
conjunct conditions. To satisfy the “necessity requirements,” the
State’s actions must be the “only way for the State to safeguard an
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril” and “should not
seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards
which the obligation exists, or of the international community.”
1.2. Argentine Cases before the ICSID Tribunals and Committees
Under the ICSID system, some tribunals or committees have allowed the broader “necessity defense,” while others approached it
narrowly and did not accept the “state of necessity.” Many investment arbitrations reveal this paradox. In the CMS Gas v. Argentine
dispute, the Tribunal indicated that the, “Argentine crisis was severe
but did not result in total economic and social collapse.”15 In addition,
the Tribunal determined that Argentine’s “government policies and
their shortcomings significantly contributed to the crisis.”16 Thus, the
Thus, the Tribunal concluded that the cumulative requirements of the
necessity under customary international law were not satisfied.17
However, during the annulment proceedings of this “Award of the
Tribunal,” the ad hoc Committee found some errors of law. According to the Committee, “Article XI of the Argentine-United States
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.

Id. at 3884-3885.
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. 2, Part 2, ¶ 14 at 83.
International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as ILC Draft 2001).
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 355 at 102. For examination to relevant paragraphs of Award see
also, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶¶ 101-110 at 26-29.
CMS Award, supra note 15, ¶ 329 at 95. See, paragraph 2(b) of Article 25 of the “ILC
Draft 2001”.
CMS Award, supra note 15, ¶ 331 at 96.
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BIT”18 and “Article 25 of the ILC Draft 2001” are substantially different. “Article XI of the BIT” regulates the measures necessary for
maintaining “public order” or the protection of “essential interests” of
the parties. Whereas “Article 25 of the ILC Draft 2001” governs the
cumulative condition of the “state of necessity.” Thus, the Committee held that these texts had different requirements and found that the
Tribunal made an “error of law” when it did not analyze them separately. However, the Committee acknowledged that annulment
committees had very limited jurisdiction under Article 52 of ICSID
Convention, and accepted that it could not apply its own view to the
dispute.19
The LG&E v. Argentine Tribunal made different conclusions
than the CMS Gas v. Argentine Tribunal. In LG&E, the Tribunal determined that the claimants could not prove that Argentine caused the
crisis and that the Argentine Government’s attitude exhibited a desire
to slow down the crisis “by all the means available.”20 So that, inter
alia other reasons the Tribunal considered that conditions for invoking the “state of necessity” were met.21 Thus, the Tribunal decided
that, because of article XI of the BIT, Argentine was exempt from international responsibility as a result of any breaches of the BIT between December 2001 and April 2003.22 The annulment proceedings
of LG&E ceased by virtue of the claimants’ request for the discontinuance of the proceeding under Rule 44 of the ICSID Arbitration
Rules.23 Because of that, we never learned how the annulment committee would react to the Tribunal’s Award.

18. “Article XI of the Argentine-United States BIT” reads as follows:
“This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the
maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its
own essential security interests.”
19. The decision of the CMS Committee, supra note 15, ¶¶ 128-136 at 34-36.
20. LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 256 at 77.
21. Id., ¶ 259 at 78.
22. Id., ¶ 229 at 68.
23. LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Order of the Secretary-General Taking
Note of the Discontinuance of the Proceeding, ¶¶ 4-7.

220

ILS Journal of International Law

Vol. VI, No. 2

The LG&E v. Argentine decision was criticized by some authors24 because the text of Article XI does not expressly exempt the
host State from the international responsibility. Nevertheless, the
Tribunal imported “Article 25 of ILC Draft 2001,” and despite Article 27 (b) regarding compensation for any material loss caused by a
wrongful act, it exempted the respondent State from responsibility for
a term involving the economic crisis. Consequently, the level of
damages assessed by the LG&E Tribunal was so low relative to the
compensation decisions of other relevant judicial bodies.25
In the Enron v. Argentine dispute, the Tribunal pointed out that
the “state of necessity” condition is very extreme, and it has strict requirements.. Therefore, notwithstanding the severe crisis, the Tribunal was not convinced that it was affecting the State’s essential interests.26 This case also involved another debate about “Article 27 (b) of
ILC Draft 2001.” The claimants argued that article 27 (b) ensures
compensation for any material loss derived from the measures which
are undertaken,27 while the respondent argued that 27 (b) entails
compensation for adopted measures after the “state of necessity” is
over. The Tribunal acknowledged that this article does not leave out
the probability of an ultimate compensation for past incidents.28
Annulment proceedings in Enron v. Argentine are quite impressive because of the different approach to “state of necessity” under
“customary international law” which was reflected in “Article 25 of
24.

25.

26.
27.
28.

See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State
Responsibility, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 501 (2012); Jose E. Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi,
The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 20082009, at 457-458 (Karl P. Sauvant, ed., 2009) (indicating that several international tribunals have affirmed that the “state of necessity” would not preclude payment of compensation under the customary law. The authors cited the ICJ Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
decision which pointed out that “state of necessity” does not excuse a State from its
obligation to compensate its partner in any situation. However, they also expressed
that the LG&E Tribunal did not address the question of compensation under the customary law requirements of the “state of necessity.” See, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, ¶ 49 at 39)).
Alec Stone Sweet, Giacinto Della Cananea, Proportionality, General Principles of
Law, and Investor-State Arbitration: A Response to Jose Alvarez, 46 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L.
& POL. 929 (2014).
Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 304-313 at 97-99.
Id. ¶ 302 at 96.
Id. ¶ 345 at 108.
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ILC Draft 2001.” As Alvarez emphasizes, this decision endorses
broadening the traditional defense of “state of necessity” under “customary international law.”29 In this case, ad hoc Annulment Committee criticized several aspects of the Enron Award. The criticisms focused inter alia on two main areas. According to the Committee, the
Tribunal relied upon expert opinion instead of implementing the customary international law rule reflected in “Article 25(1)(a) of ILC
Draft 2001.” Also, the Tribunal failed to explain why the “only way”
requirement under Article 25(1)(a) was not satisfied. This triggered
the “annulment decision under Article 52(1)(b) and (e) of the ICSID
Convention.”30
The Enron Annulment Committee’s decision could be seen as an
exceptional interpretation compared to other annulment committees’
decisions. Indeed, the CMS Annulment Committee concluded that
“whatever may have been the errors made in this respect by the Tribunal, there is no manifest excess of powers or lack of reasoning on
the part of the Award concerning the Article XI of the BIT and the
state of necessity under customary international law.”31 Thus, the
CMS Committee only upheld the annulment request concerning the
umbrella clause and dismissed other claims.32 Despite accepting the
broader necessity defense under customary law, The Enron Committee, like the CMS Committee, noted that “Article 25 of ILC Draft
2001” and “Article XI of the BIT,” are not the same because they
have different operations and content. As a result, the Enron Committee annulled the Tribunal’s Award regarding the inapplicability of
“Article 25 of ILC Draft 2001” and “Article XI of the BIT” separately.33
The Sempra v. Argentine Tribunal had the opportunity to examine other Awards because it was decided later than other cases filed
against Argentine. The Sempra Tribunal indicated that the LG&E
conclusions were different from the CMS and Enron Awards. From
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.

José E. Alvarez, State Sovereignty is Not Withering Away: A Few Lessons for the Future, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (Antonio Cassese
ed., 2012).
The Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶¶ 377-378 at 154.
CMS Annulment Committee, supra note 15, ¶ 150 at 40.
Id. ¶ 159 at 43.
Enron Annulment Committee, supra note 30, ¶ 405 at 161-62.

222

ILS Journal of International Law

Vol. VI, No. 2

the Tribunal’s perspective, these differences can be explained with
distinct legal interpretations of the “Argentine-U.S. BIT” and evaluation of the facts in each case. Apart from that, the Sempra Tribunal
admitted that its two arbitrators also sat on the CMS Tribunal. Arguably however, the Tribunal’s Constitution influenced their conclusion. Arbitrators were not more convinced than the CMS and Enron
Tribunals about the influence of the economic crisis over the government’s actions against investors. Consequently, the Sempra Tribunal did not accept Argentine’s defense concerning the “state of necessity”; however, it acknowledged that economic situations might
affect the value of investment and compensation issue.34
The Sempra Tribunal pointed out that “state of necessity” was
regulated by customary international law, not “Article XI of the
BIT.” The Tribunal explained that treaty provisions are generally
more specific than customary laws. However, the Sempra Tribunal
does not indicate that “Argentine-U.S. BIT” contains any prerequisites for a “necessity defense.” Therefore, one must inevitably look
for the “state of necessity” requirements under customary law, not in
Article XI.35
After these considerations, the Sempra Tribunal concluded Article XI of the BIT was not self-judging, and, because the requirements
of necessity in customary international law were not met, there was
no need for further judicial review under Article XI of the BIT. 36 In
the Sempra annulment proceedings, the Committee concluded the
Tribunal did not implement Article XI of the BIT as an applicable
law, and it therefore exceeded its powers by failing to implement Article XI of the BIT.37 The Sempra Committee indicated that as long as
Article XI could be applied to the dispute, it was not possible to
comment on breach of the BIT because Article XI confines the obligations derived from the treaty. Unlike Article XI of the BIT, Article
25 of the ILC Draft 2001 is a supplementary rule for precluding
wrongfulness. Moreover, the state of necessity in Article 25 does not

34.
35.
36.
37.

Sempra Energy Int’l v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award,
¶ 346 at 102-03.
Id. ¶ 378 at 111.
Id. ¶ 388 at 114.
Decision on the Argentine Republic’s Application for Annulment of the Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 214-219 at 46.
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remove or terminate an international obligation.38 It looks like both
the Sempra and CMS Committees chose the same path on the legal
ground for annulment. Both the Sempra and CMS Tribunals ignored
the applicability of Article XI of the BIT and considered that if the
state of necessity requirements were not met under customary international law, there is no need to examine applicability of the BIT.
Nevertheless, some authors assert that neither Article XI nor the
U.S.-Argentine BIT are lex specialis. Furthermore, they deny the
view that Article XI of the BIT is self-executing.39 These authors particularly assert the BIT does not constitute a self-contained regime
distinct from general international law. They also claim the text of
Article XI is not the same as Article 25 of the ILC Draft 2001; thus,
the customary international law excuse of necessity is not applicable
to Article XI.40 However, the authors accept that general international
law, especially customary international law, may be significant for
interpreting the BIT. As such, the treaty must be construed under the
38.
39.

40.

Id. ¶ 115, at 20.
Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 24, at 417-424. These authors strongly oppose the
Burke-White’s and von Staden’s views regarding the review of NPM clauses in BITs
with the standard of “good faith” or accepting such clauses as “self-judging” provisions. See, William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 337-341 (2008).
Burke-White and von Staden asserted that the United States and Argentine intended
“Article XI of the BIT” to be “self-judging” and subject only to a “good faith review”
which is the core of international law; therefore, they indicate that the CMS, Enron,
and Sempra Tribunals misinterpreted the “Article XI of the BIT.” Indeed, the authors’
conclusions are similar to the ad hoc Committees’ annulment decisions regarding
those Tribunals’ Awards. See, Sempra Annulment Decision, supra note 37, ¶ 127. The
Sempra Committee decided that “by disregarding the self-judging nature of Article XI,
the Tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers.” Compare with, Enron Annulment
Committee, supra note 30, ¶¶ 401-402, 406. The Enron Committee considered that
this is not its duty to determine whether the Tribunal’s finding concerning the Article
XI is not a “self-judging” provision. Instead of that, the Committee annulled the
Award of the Tribunal due to the preclusion of Argentine by the Tribunal for resorting
on the “Article XI of the BIT” and the “principle of necessity” under the “customary
international law.”
See, e.g., Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 24, at 428; Andrea K. Bjorklund, Economic
Security Defenses in International Investment Law, in YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2008-2009, 495-496 (Karl P.
Sauvant, ed., 2009). Bjorklund endorsed the view of Alvarez and Khamsi concerning
the phrase of “essential security interests” indicating that the drafters of BIT aimed to
preserve customary law principles of the force majeure, distress, and necessity. According to him, the customary law would provide better protection than the BIT in
case of a contrary conclusion.
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terms of customary international law that parties explicitly or implicitly intended to incorporate.41
To the contrary, other authors who support the CMS, Enron, and
Sempra Annulment Committees’ decisions, indicated that, despite the
fact that ad hoc committees were not authorized to annul awards by
“errors in law,” these judicial bodies found the errors which they detected.42 Thus, these Committees determined that Article XI of the
BIT and Article 25 of ILC Draft 2001 separately exist and have different requirements. Likewise, William Burke-White and Andreas
von Staden defend the idea of utilizing the clauses of “non-precluded
measures” (NPM) in BITs such as Article XI of the U.S.-Argentine
BIT. They suggest that, in the case of an NPM clause not being “selfjudging,” arbitral tribunals can follow up with the doctrine of “margin of appreciation.”43 Diane Desierto masterfully explains the difference between circumstances precluding the wrongfulness of States’
actions under customary international law and treaty-based nonprecluded measures undertaken by States. Desierto points out that
when interpreting a treaty, law-appliers must focus on the necessity
clause within a specific treaty and avoid any assumptions about other
norms in “general international law” such as Article 25 of the ILC
Draft 2001.44 Hereby, law-appliers must contemplate whether the investment treaty permits use of necessity as a justification.45
In my opinion, this discernment is helpful to understand some
differences between necessity regulation in customary international
law and public order regulation in the specific treaty. General international law, especially customary international law can be a useful tool
for interpretation of international agreements pursuant to Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; however,
this does not mean similar provisions should be overlapped as an article in a treaty and as a provision in customary international law.
Both of them separately subsist under international law.
However, the complexity of the issue may have originated from
the separate foundations of international investment law. Stephan
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 24, at 465.
Sweet & Cananea, supra note 25, at 930-931.
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 39, at 379.
DIANE A. DESIERTO, NECESSITY AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY CLAUSES,
18 (2012).
Id. at 185.
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Schill demonstrates this point specifically from the perspective of investment law. He contemplates investment law as a “discipline that
may be more open than other areas of international law in permitting
different conceptual and methodological approaches.”46 He also asserts that investment law must be considered using a State-market relationship with economic and political interests rather than reference
to technical grounds relating to jurisprudence.47
2.

Economic Analysis of International Investment Law

2.1. Theoretical Approaches
Recently, some writers question investment law from an economic perspective which might be called “economic analysis of law.”
Economic analysis of law asserts that financial crises are derived
from inadequate and inaccurate policies of governments. As one of
the supporters of the economic analysis of law, Alan Sykes states that
the host countries’ fiscal and monetary policies frequently contribute
to financial crises; therefore, he asserts that if a necessity defense is
upheld, it can cause a substantial moral hazard.48 He also showed the
possibility of liability of public officials from public policies even if
actual investment law does not contain it.49 Likewise, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson considered that international organizations (such as the IMF) advise developing countries that macroeconomic issues are not always successful because public officials do not
often comply with their advice.50 Actually, this opinion was accepted
by some of the tribunals mentioned above. Those tribunals admitted
that economic policies of the Argentine government contributed to
the crisis.51 Nevertheless, economic analysis of law under various situations can favor host States. For example, assuming a contractually
unaddressed risk occurs in an investment, if the relevant risk was (or
should have been) known by the investor, a tribunal may dismiss the
request for damages unless property is seized without compensation.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 903 (2011).
Id. at 904-905.
Alan O. Sykes, Economic “Necessity” in International Law, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 296,
313 (2015) (author’s observations on fiscal and currency crises).
Id. at 315.
DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL, 446-447 (2013).
See, e.g., CMS Award, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at ¶ 329.
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In such a case, economists can help tribunals determine whether the
relevant risk is acceptable as an investment risk.52
Examination of public international law disputes through a contractual basis approach or economic analysis of law is not a new idea.
Approximately one hundred years ago, the Tribunal of the Russian
Indemnity53 case did this review.54 This case concerned indemnity for
losses suffered by Russian subjects during the 1877-1878 war with
Turkey. In 1879, Russia and Turkey signed the Peace Treaty in Istanbul. Article V of the Peace Treaty governed indemnity. 55 Although
partial payments were made, the Turkish government postponed
payment for more than twenty years. In 1902, Turkey made the outstanding payment, but Russia demanded interest for the delayed
payment. Turkey objected to the Russian demand for interest and asserted “Article V of the Treaty of Peace of 1879 and the Protocol of
the same date [did] not provide for interest.”56
The parties agreed to take the dispute to an arbitral tribunal. Turkey pled economic exigency, among other things. The Tribunal accepted that Turkey was, from 1881 to 1902 under financial difficulties. But, Russia asserted that “during this same period and especially
following the establishment of the Ottoman Bank, Turkey was able to
obtain some loans at favorable rates, to redeem other loans, and, finally, to pay off a large part of its public debt, estimated at
350,000,000 francs.”57 The Tribunal understood that if the plea were
upheld, it would be many times more than the small sum of about six
million francs for actual Russian losses. Thus, it dismissed this defense because the conditions for force majeure were not met.58 From
52.

Bastian Gottschling & Willis Geffert, An Economic Assessment of Contracts, Requests for Contract Reform, and Damages in International Arbitration, in THE USE OF
ECONOMICS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 319, 326 (Marion
Jansen, et al. eds., 2017).
53. See Russian Claim for Interest on Indemnities (Russ. v. Turk.), Award (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1912) [hereinafter Russian Indemnity].
54. See also Sloane, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 460-61.
55. Russian Indemnity, supra note 53, at 4.
56. Id. at 7.
57. Id. at 13.
58. The Tribunal described this plea as force majeure but today this defense conforms to
“state of necessity.” See, Sloane, supra note 33, at 460. Indeed, Russia in its Reply described the “state of necessity”:
“The exception of force majeure cited as the most important may be pleaded in opposition in
public as well as in private international law; international law must adapt itself to po-
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an economic perspective, the judgment of the Tribunal is quite significant. Although this was an inter-State arbitration, the Tribunal dealt
with the case as a classic creditor-debtor relation. However, the Russian claim, notwithstanding the economic exigency defense, was rejected because Russia had not explicitly demanded interest for damages before the payment.59
The idea of the “conservative analysis of law” requires isolation
of other disciplines and circumstances from the legal instruments.
This idea protects international law from any interference from other
disciplines.60 For instance, when handling the relationship between
investment law and development, most of the scholars contemplate
these disciplines as rival rather than as supportive.61 However, the
fear of some scholars is that if other factors are incorporated into the
investment law it may reduce the level of investment protection in international law. Therefore, this approach endorses the notion that investment treaties must be interpreted in the context of international
law.62 The primary concern is whether such human rights and environmental issues will become dominant factors in investment disputes. But, that anxiety is also thinkable for economic matters.
Dunoff and Trachtman competently describe the fears of “conservatives” about the legal matters. According to them, many international
lawyers hesitate to use economics because of a lack of confidence in

59.
60.
61.

62.

litical necessities. The Imperial Russian Government expressly admits that the obligation of a State to fulfill treaties may give way “if the very existence of the State should
be in danger if the observance of the international duty is . . . self-destructive.” See,
Russian Indemnity, Award, at 12.
Id. at 15.
LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 395-397 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker
Röben eds., 2008).
Stephan W. Schill, Christian J. Tams & Rainer Hofmann, International Investment
Law and Development: Friends or Foes? in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP, 41 (Stephan W. Schill et al.
eds., 2015).
MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 78-79 (2010). But see, Charles H. Brower, Obstacles and
Pathways to Consideration of the Public Interest in Investment Treaty Disputes, in
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2008-2009,
378 (Karl P. Sauvant, ed., 2009). Brower points out that there is no international
definition of the “public interest” in international law. However, the author suggests
that arbitration tribunals not only engage with investors’ protection but also the
humanitarian consideration in the disputes. Therefore, he calls for arbitration tribunals
to utilize the “public interest” concept with more transparency and systematically.
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their quantitative and economic skills. However, the authors point
out that many types of economic analysis of law do not require complex mathematical tools.63 Indeed, apart from damage calculations,
international law does not involve complex mathematical processes.64
Despite that, use of economic tools other than the damage calculation
is very rarely used in investment arbitration.65
2.2. The Practice of “Investment Definition” in ICSID
Another important issue for economic analysis of law in investment disputes is the definition of “investment” and its requirements.
In this regard, the “Salini test” is at the center of debates. This test defines the “investment” involving the “contribution of money or assets,” “a certain duration of performance of the contract,” “participation in the risks of the transaction” and the “contribution to the
economic development of host State,” which is derived from the
ICSID Convention’s Preamble.66 The first three conditions exist in
the doctrine, but the fourth condition is developed by the Salini Tribunal. This last criterion has become very controversial in judicial
practice. While some of the tribunals have accepted this criterion67,
63.

Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24
YALE J. INT’L L. 7 (1999). The authors considered that the concerns of international
jurists about the law & economics (L&E) could be described with three main thoughts:
1) L&E’s seemingly inaccessible methodologies, 2) L&E’s supposedly conservative
political prejudices, 3) L&E’s positivism and its presumed denigration of international
law. Id. at 6.
64. Pauwelyn states that both ICSID and WTO arbitrators calculated the damage amount
with a few paragraphs in their decisions in 2000’s years. But over the ten years after
these decisions, damages calculations have advanced amazingly. See, Joost Pauwelyn,
The Use, Non-use and Abuse of Economics in WTO and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in WTO LITIGATION, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, AND
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, (Jorge A. Huerta-Goldman et al. eds., 2013).
Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2141357 at 4.
65. Id. at 15.
66. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case
No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 42, INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS, ¶ 52, at
622 (2003).
67. See, Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, 14, ICSID
Rev/FILJ, ¶ 64, at 273 (1999). Following decisions have evolved the fourth criterion
from “contribution to the economic development” to “significance of the contribution
to the economic development.” See; Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic
of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 53, at 12, Bayindir
Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 137, at 37, Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 91-92, at 29,
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others have rejected it.68 Schreuer describes this situation as unfortunate because the Salini test criteria should not be accepted as strict jurisdictional requirements that each one of them must be met separately.69 He also indicated that even if one international transaction
cannot “contribute to the host State’s economic development,” it does
not mean that this operation must be excluded from ICSID Convention’s protection.70 Many of ICSID Tribunals have followed specific
investment definitions in relevant BITs and accepted various financial tools such as loans, promissory notes, and minority stock shares
as investments. However, after the Salini decision, ICSID Tribunals
show reluctance to accept this broad investment definition.71 For instance, in the Malaysian Salvors case, the Tribunal did not recognize
a marine salvage contract as an investment because it is not capable
of providing a significant “contribution to the host State’s economic
development” and could not benefit Malaysian public interest. 72 The
Joy Mining case is another example of the application of strict investment requirements. In this dispute, the Tribunal did not qualify
either mixed contract or relevant bank guarantees and pledges as an
investment.73 Despite the Tribunal’s decisions, it was aware of many

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.
73.

Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/10, Award on Jurisdiction, ¶ 131, at 45.
Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, ¶ 111, at 36
(The Tribunal concluded that the condition of the “contribution to the economic development of host state” is one of the objectives of ICSID Convention, this objective is
not one of the criteria of investment), Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I.- DIPENTA v.
Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08, Award (English translation from ICSID), ¶
13(iv), at 21 (The Tribunal considered that there is no separate condition regarding the
“contribution of the investment to the host country’s economic development” and accepted that this criterion takes part implicitly in the other three criteria.).
THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, ¶171 at 133 (Christoph H.
Schreuer et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009). He also added that the Salini Tribunal emphasized
that investment criteria should be contemplated in conjunction. See, Salini v. Morocco,
Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 66, ¶ 52 at 622.
Schreuer, supra note 69, ¶ 173 at 134; See also, Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning
of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law,
51 HARVARD INT’L L. J. 274 (2010).
Id. at 279. In the same way, Schreuer points out that if “contribution to the economic
development” criterion will be applied by the tribunals, arbitrators must show some
flexibility. He also suggests that arbitrators should not seek the criterion of contribution to host state’s GDP necessarily. See, Schreuer, supra note 69, ¶ 174 at 134.
Malaysian Historical Salvors v. The Government of Malaysia, supra note 67, ¶¶ 125131, at 43-45 [hereinafter Salvors].
Joy Mining v. Egypt, supra note 67, ¶ 55, at 13.
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ICSID decisions that had given a wider purview to the investment
definition. But, it analyzed that other cases have undoubtedly had investment operation or an arbitration clause in their contracts. According to the Tribunal, a “sale or procurement contract,” even if it has
sophisticated features, should not qualify as an investment.74
Before that narrow interpretation of investment definition occurred in the jurisprudence, some tribunals such as the Fedax Tribunal applied the broad interpretation of investment definition test. The
Fedax Tribunal evaluated promissory notes as an investment because
of their benefits for the Venezuela Treasury derived from the existence of fundamental national interests indicated in Venezuela’s “Law
on Public Credit.”75 The Tribunal also pointed out that the term “directly” in Article 25 of ICSID Convention connected with the “dispute” and not the “investment.” Hence, jurisdictional requirements of
ICSID are met as long as a dispute directly emerges from an economic transaction, even if this operation has not been qualified as direct
investment by itself.76 Similarly, the CSOB Tribunal quoted the Fedax decision and clarified that issue. The CSOB Tribunal decided to
follow the Fedax Tribunal’s interpretation of the definition of investment. According to the CSOB Tribunal, an investment generally
consists of several linked transactions, however, some transactions
may not, by itself, be qualified as an investment. Although, in terms
of the jurisdictional requirements of ICSID, it is important to determine if the whole operation can be qualified as an investment independent from its sub-transactions.77
Holiday Inns v. Morocco is a significant case that is a predecessor of the decisions mentioned above. The Tribunal evaluated separate loan contracts within the “general unity of an investment opera-

74.
75.

76.
77.

Id, ¶¶ 58-59, at 14.
Fedax N.V. v. The Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision of
the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (July 11, 1997), 37 INT’L LEGAL
MATERIALS ¶ 42 at 1386 (1998). But see Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box:
Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 720-721 (2007).
Waibel asserts that so-called “public interest” test does not convert a commercial
transaction to the investment. He also considered that such a test does not satisfy the
jurisdictional conditions in the Article 25 of ICSID Convention.
Fedax v. Venez., supra note 75, ¶ 24, at 1383.
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. The Slovak Republic, supra note 67, ¶ 72,
at 275.
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tion.”78 It considered that isolating some juridical acts from others is
not coherent with economic reality and parties’ intentions.79 Travaux
préparatoires of the ICSID Convention shows that various attempts
for limitation of investment definition failed. Consequently, with an
endorsement of some delegates, the United Kingdom delegate proposed to exclude the investment definition for hampering jurisdictional obstacles and it was accepted by the Legal Committee.80
Recent developments in investment cases show that the “Salini
effect”, which identified an investment with a mandatory list of characteristics, is losing its influence.81 The Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania
case can be seen as a cornerstone. In this case, the Tribunal explicitly
emphasized that the “Salini criteria” are not compulsory as a matter
of law and there is no legal basis in the ICSID Convention for applying strict requirements.82 Therefore, according to the Tribunal, these
criteria are not applicable to all disputes. Hence an appropriate approach must consider all features of the case, particularly the relevant
legal instruments which consent to ICSID arbitration.83 Another example, in the same way, is the Malaysian Salvors Annulment Decision. Malaysian Salvors Ad Hoc Committee quoted the Biwater
Gauff Award for pointing out the danger of the inflexible “Salini criteria.” With reference to the relevant passage, if tribunals adhere to
the “Salini criteria,” there will appear a definitional contradiction between agreements or treaties and the Salini definition.84 Consequent-

78.
79.

80.
81.

82.
83.
84.

Pierre Lalive, The First World Bank Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco)-Some Legal Problems, 51 BRITISH YEARBOOK INT’L L. 159 (1981).
See Id. Besides the above, some other tribunals mentioned this decision, and when
determining whether an investment exists, they examined the entire operation. See also
Saipem S.p.A. v. The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation on Provisional Measures, ¶ 110, at 31.
See, Schreuer, supra note 69, ¶ 115, at 115.
David A. R. Williams & Simon Foote, Recent Developments in the Approach to Identifying an “Investment” Pursuant to Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, in
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION, 63 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, ¶ 312-313 at 86 (July 24, 2008).
Id. ¶¶ 313-316, at 86-87.
Id. ¶ 316 at 87; Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. The Government of Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment, ¶ 79,
at 33-35 (July 24, 2008).
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ly, the Committee annulled the Tribunal’s Award in accordance with
“Article 52(1)(b) of ICSID Convention.”85
I am of the opinion that these last decisions can be considered as
a recovery in ICSID case law through the acknowledgment of a nonrestrictive investment definition for the jurisdictional requirement.
When some tribunals begin to add supplemental conditions to the
Salini criteria, jurisdictional thresholds are getting higher.86 Therefore, this recovery in the case law is consistent with the intentions of
the ICSID Convention drafters and purposes of the Convention. Especially, as Williams and Foote stated, the requirement of “significant contribution to the economy of the host state” is severely weakened in practice.87 Actually, this fluctuation either in “investment
definition” or “state of necessity” in ICSID case law can be explained
by a different problem, that of State sovereignty.88 Brower and Schill
defined this problem under the “legitimacy” term and elucidated this
issue about investment arbitrations as beyond the problems of predictability and consistency.89 According to them, critiques about the
85.

86.

87.
88.
89.

Id. ¶ 80 at 35. The reasons of the annulment by the Committee are; i) Tribunal’s limited analysis relating to Article 25 of ICSID Convention ii) to fail reviewing the Convention’s preparatory work iii) disregarding small contributions to the host state’s
economy such as cultural or historical contributions.
See generally, Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/5, Award (April 15, 2009). In this dispute, the Tribunal added two criteria to
the Salini test. These supplemental criteria are; i) assets invested with bona fide and ii)
assets invested in accordance with the laws of the host State. Id, ¶ 114, at 45. Particularly, good faith (bona fide) investment criterion is controversial. This criterion can be
criticized from the different aspects. First, the “good faith” is one of the “general principles of law” which be applied to the international law, but it was not contemplated as
the jurisdictional condition by drafters of the ICSID Convention. Second, this principle
is only usable for supportive argument in the reasoning of Tribunal which serves for
treaty-based arbitrations. Finally, characterization of investment as “illegal in host
state law” or “not made in good faith” does not change qualification of investment in
the international arena. See Saba Fakes v. Turkey, supra note 68, ¶¶ 112-113, at 36-37.
Unlike the Phoenix Tribunal, the Saba Fakes Tribunal even though it did not use the
“good faith” principle and restrictive investment definition, it concluded that had not
been made any investment by the claimant. Id, ¶147, at 47. Some authors have explicitly expressed their concerns about the various financial instruments and noninfrastructure contracts which are under risk of exclusion from the investment definition in ICSID practice. See, Mortenson, supra note 70, at 279.
David A. R. Williams & Simon Foote, supra note 80, at 63.
See, Mortenson, supra note 70, at 312-313.
Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law, 9 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 471, 473-74,
(2009).
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issue consist of two distinct thoughts. The first view is the “Marxist
analysis of law” which asserted that investment law is an attempt by
developed countries to impose their power on developing countries.
The second view defends that investment law is an unequal regime
which protects foreign investors and their properties; although, this
regime does not ensure sufficient discretion to the host States for
their non-investment benefits.90 Nevertheless, the last view has become the effective background of some recent cases.
2.3. Non-Investment Factors and the Doctrine of “Margin of Appreciation”
The recent case of Philip Morris v. Uruguay is a good example
of non-investment factors’ effects on the investment dispute. In this
case, the Tribunal reviewed each relevant measure adopted by national agencies relating to the tobacco consumption.91Despite claimants’ objections, arbitrators used the doctrine of “margin of appreciation” in this dispute because this doctrine is not only peculiar to the
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, ECHR), but is
also applicable to bilateral investment treaties especially in “public
health” issues.92 That is not the first case which an ICSID Tribunal
applied a “margin of appreciation.” Before this recent case, the Continental Casualty v. Argentine Tribunal explicitly applied this doctrine in another case, which involved another dispute derived from
Argentine’s economic crisis. In this case, the Tribunal decided that
Article XI of Argentine-U.S. BIT is not “self-judging.” Nonetheless,
the Tribunal stated that Article XI of the BIT contained a “margin of
appreciation” inherent to each party which invokes it.93
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 474.
Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v.
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 388 at 111.
Id. ¶¶ 398-399 at 115.
Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 181, 187-188 at 80, 82-83. The Tribunal justified its conclusion
with the United States argument in the Oil Platforms case. According to the Continental Casualty Tribunal, the Article XX, paragraph 1 (d) of the 1955 Iran-United States
Amity Treaty had provided to the parties a “margin of discretion.” Nonetheless, ICJ
decided that the “self-defense” concept has no ground for the doctrine of the “margin
of discretion” due to its strict requirements. See, Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of
Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, ¶ 73 at 196. Therefore, Continental Casualty Tribunal underlined that accepting “margin of discretion”
in the measures might give rise getting rid of treaty obligations by a party which has
been undertaken these measures. But also, the Tribunal has considered that the time of
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When we turn back again to the Philip Morris case, the dissenting opinion of Gary Born is worth mentioning. He indicated that
“margin of appreciation” relied on the language of the ECHR and its
Protocols (especially the first Protocol); therefore, the Tribunal
should not transplant this doctrine from the ECHR to the relevant
BIT (Uruguay-Switzerland) or the customary international law.94 He
continued that the ECHR interprets their Article 1 of Protocol 1to be
very extensive in the expropriation of properties by governments and
gives wide range “margin of appreciation” to the governmental authorities about what constitutes “public interest” in the act of expropriation.95 In contrast, there is no equivalent provision in the Uruguay-Switzerland BIT. Also, travaux préparatoires, also known as the
official records of negotiation, of the BIT does not indicate whether
parties intended to accept the “margin of appreciation.”96
These inferences of the Born’s dissenting opinion are in line with
thoughts of the Judge Anzilotti in the Oscar Chinn case. Judge Anzilotti stated that “international law would be merely an empty phrase
if it sufficed for a State to invoke the public interest in order to evade
the fulfillment of its engagements.”97 ICJ and ICSID Tribunals conformed to this approach and rejected to apply the doctrine of “margin
of appreciation” in various cases.98 For instance, in the Construction

94.
95.
96.
97.

98.

severe economic crisis provides significant “margin of discretion” to the host States in
their measures. See also, Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 39, at 375. The authors support the utilization of “margin of appreciation” doctrine in international investment law. For the authors, that doctrine especially has importance to preserve legitimacy in investor-State arbitration. Therefore, arbitral tribunals may apply the NPM
clauses in the BITs. Burke-White and von Staden suggest that different indications can
be applied by the tribunals depending on the nature of the dispute. For instance, while
have been granting maximum deference to the States in “public morality” issues; on
the other hand, that deference to the States’ measures could be at the minimum level in
the “public health” issues which are more scientific.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Gary Born, supra note 91, Annex B, ¶ 138 at
33.
Id. ¶ 183 at 42.
Id. ¶184, at 42.
The Oscar Chinn Case (U.K. v. Belg.), Judgment, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, 65,
112 (Dec.12), (separate opinion by Anzilotti, M.). U.K. v. Belgium, 1934 P.C.I.J. at
184.
Philip Morris v. Uruguay, supra note 91, ¶186-190 (This case is a great example of
how non-investment factors can effect an investment dispute. This is one of the rare
cases where the Tribunal reviews each measure adopted by national agencies as it related to tobacco consumption and ultimately applied the ‘margin of appreciation.’).
See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
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of a Wall Advisory Opinion, the ICJ decided that the route of the
wall, which was chosen by Israel, could not be justified by the requirements of “public order” and “national security.” Therefore, according to the Court, this wall construction breaches Israel’s obligations under international humanitarian law.99 The ICJ considered that
Israel could not invoke “self-defense” under UN Charter Article 51 or
“state of necessity” under the customary international law for the
prevention of the wrongfulness of the construction of a wall.100 Another example from the ICJ’s jurisprudence is the Whaling in the
Antarctica case, which was rendered by the Court recently. This case
is remarkable regarding the respondent’s allegations about having a
“margin of appreciation” in scientific research related to the whales.
In response to that claim, the ICJ considered that “the killing, taking,
and treating of whales pursuant to a requested special permit is for
purposes of scientific research cannot depend simply on that State’s
perception.”101 Instead of the using the “margin of appreciation”
standard, which was claimed by the respondent, the ICJ preferred the
concept of “standard of review”, which is known from the “World
Trade Organization” (WTO) jurisprudence.102
It seems that if a treaty does not grant the “margin of appreciation” in the
acts of State parties such as Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR,
the doctrine must not be applied by the international judicial bodies.
The argument of the “international judicial bodies has inherent power
to use this doctrine” cannot justify the issue.103 The “margin of appre-

99.
100.
101.
102.

103.

Law? 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 931-940 (2005), “for the critiques about ICJ decisions
which rejected to apply the ‘margin of appreciation.’”
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 193, ¶ 137 (July 9).
Id. ¶ 142 at 195.
Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 253, ¶ 61 (Mar.
31).
Theodore Christakis, The “Margin of Appreciation” in the Use of Exemptions in International Law: Comparing the ICJ Whaling Judgment and the Case Law of the ECtHR (2015), in WHALING IN THE ANTARCTIC: SIGNIFICANCE AND
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ICJ JUDGMENT, 2016, 139, 151-54 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Dai Tamada eds., 2016). The author assumes that even if ICJ would use the
“margin of appreciation” doctrine, the conclusion will not change in favor of respondent due to the hardness of accepting the killing of whales under the name of scientific
research for the interest of the State.
See Shany, supra note 98, at 911.
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ciation” is neither accepted as the “international customary rule” nor
the “general principle of law.” For elaboration on the issue, examining the “International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea” (hereinafter,
ITLOS) cases may be useful as they relate to the prompt release of
vessels and crews might be useful. For instance, in the Juno Trader
case, the ITLOS demonstrated which principles prevail when assessing reasonable bond in the prompt release cases. Accordingly,
Article 73 of the “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”
(hereinafter, UNCLOS) must be evaluated in the light of considerations of humanity and due process of law. The requirement of reasonable bond in prompt release of vessels and crews
follow this approach.104
The ITLOS chose to follow well-established legal principles instead of the “margin of appreciation” doctrine in the prompt release
procedure under the Article 73 of UNCLOS.105 This preference of the
ITLOS seems to have originated from its avoidance of non-wellestablished concepts and doctrines in international law such as “margin of appreciation.” “Considerations of humanity” and “due process
of law” are rooted legal principles compared to “margin of appreciation.” The ICJ applied the principle of “considerations of humanity”
in the Corfu Channel case for the first time,106 but it has not maintained the same approach afterward.107 After the inauguration of the
104. Juno Trader (No. 13) (St. Vincent v. Guinea-Bissau), Case No. 13, Judgment of Dec.
18, 2004, 1 ¶ 77, ITLOS Rep. ¶ 77, at 38-39 (emphasis added).
105. In his study, Judge Cot construed that the observation of the ITLOS is not contrary to
the “margin of appreciation” doctrine. Jean-Pierre Cot, The Law of the Sea and the
Margin of Appreciation, in LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A.
MENSAH, 389, 403 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007).
106. The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 22 (Apr.
9). The Court indicated that “elementary considerations of humanity” is general and
well recognized principle. Id. at 22.
107. In the South West Africa cases, ICJ did not accept that “humanitarian considerations”
can generate legal rights and obligations. The Court admitted that all states have interests in such matters, but these considerations have not the juridical character. South
West Africa Cases (Eth.& Libya v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 34, ¶ 49-50
(July 18). However, these reviews have not welcomed by some judges. For example,
Judge Jessup stated that for long years international law recognized that states have legal interests other than economic or material issues. South West Africa Cases (Eth. &
Libya v. S. Afr.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. Rep. 425 (Dec. 21)
(separate opinion by Jessup, P.). Judge Tanaka also supported to the Judge Jessup and
illustrated that states have legal interests in humanitarian issues such as suppression of
slave trade, the Genocide Convention and the constitution of the International Labor
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ITLOS, this consideration was revived in the practice of international
law.108 In addition to the ITLOS,109 also some arbitral tribunals110
which were constituted pursuant to Annex VII of UNCLOS, utilized
the principle of “considerations of humanity.” Nevertheless, some authors criticized this principle because it was not used enough in State
practice.111
Even well-established principles such as “considerations of humanity” have been criticized by some scholars in international law
for the lack of the justification when they are used by the international judicial bodies. Hence, it was inevitable that the doctrine of “margin of appreciation” would also be critiqued.112 At this point, the
ECHR also has been criticized for using the “margin of appreciation”
doctrine. Accordingly, that doctrine threatens fundamental rights and

108.
109.

110.

111.

112.

Organization. South West Africa Cases, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 252 (July 18) (dissenting
opinion by Tanaka, K.).
ABDULKADİR G.L.R., ULUSLARARASI DENIZ HUKUKU MAHKEMESININ YAPISI VE
YARGI YETKISI, 65 (Onikilevha , 1st ed. 2017).
See, The M/V Saiga (No.2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Judgment of July 1,
1999, 3 ITLOS Rep. 1, 22 at ¶155. “In considering the force used by Guinea in the arrest of the Saiga, the Tribunal must take into account the circumstances of the arrest in
the context of the applicable rules of international law. Although the Convention does
not contain express provisions on the use of force in the arrest of ships, international
law, which is applicable by virtue of article 293 of the Convention, requires that the
use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must
not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Considerations
of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in other areas of international
law.”) (emphasis added).
The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (It. v. India), Case No. 2015-28, Order, 1, ¶ 104, 106 at
27 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1707. Here, the Tribunal considered that it should give effect to the principle of “considerations of humanity” for relaxation to bail conditions of Italian marine Sergeant Girone.
Koskenniemi who well-known with his critiques in the international law indicated that
no State would deny “elementary considerations of humanity” principle which has
been accepted for the practice of their inter-State relations. Martti Koskenniemi, From
Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 167 (2006). Afterward, he argued that whether this norm has enough past compliance in the State
practice for accepting as a customary law rule, is disputed. Id. at 408. Chigara is another writer who criticized the ITLOS and ICJ decisions for non-obeyance to the requirements of the Article 38/1(b) of the ICJ Statute which involves opinio juris, State
practice, and the time element. Ben Chigara, International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea and Customary International Law, 22 LOY. LOS ANGELES INT’L & COMP. L. R.
433, 442-451 (2000). According to him, when an international court or tribunal resort
to a principle such as “considerations of humanity,” it must justify why it resorts to
this principle and clarifies State practice and other requirements. Id. at 445.
Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54 VA. J.
INT’L L. 545, 558 (2014).
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the rule of law.113 Brauch asserted that the ECHR’s European consensus as it related to the “margin of appreciation” did not constitute a
legal standard. Neither applicants nor the Member States of ECHR
have enough information on how government actions can accommodate this European consensus.114 However, even in the context of the
ECHR, the doctrine of “margin of appreciation” has rarely been implemented, especially in “right to life” or “prohibition of torture” cases.115 This situation will likely change under Article 1 of Protocol 15
of the ECHR.116 This provision entrenched the “margin of appreciation” doctrine to the ECHR dispute settlement system. The deference
of State actions will be more comprehensive than it used to be in the
past after adding that doctrine to the Preamble of the ECHR. However, alteration as mentioned above in the Preamble of ECHR does not
cover all of international law. Each dispute settlement system
(UNCLOS, ICSID, WTO, etc.) must be assessed in the context of its
legal instruments. This assessment must be made by their relevant
dispute settlement bodies regarding whether it is required or not by
looking either to deference or appreciation of a government’s acts in
a dispute.
To sum up, each principle or doctrine must be examined in detail
when it will be applied to a particular dispute. For instance, it is not
appropriate to use the doctrine of margin of appreciation in a dispute
relating to a right to life or prohibition of torture argument. Therefore, this doctrine must not be applied to such disputes. Apart from
this, if a conflict involves humanitarian issues, the considerations of
113. See, Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113,
150 (2004).
114. Id. at 145-46.
115. BAŞAK ALI, The Authority of International Law, 82 (OUP Oxford, 2015) (The author describing the “margin of
appreciation” as a doctrine which rebuttable duties entail in the ECHR context, but claiming
that the scope of rebuttal in the precedents of ECHR is very narrow or non-existent).
116. Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, June 24, 2013, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R (2013), “At the end of
the preamble to the Convention, a new recital shall be added, which shall read as follows: Affirming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined
in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin
of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention.”) (emphasis added).
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humanity principle can be applied to that case instead of an economic
analysis of law application. Wrongful implementation of a principle
or doctrine would undermine the legitimacy of international judicial
bodies and fair expectations of them. On the other hand, if a dispute
has an intensive economic character, such as an investment dispute or
trade dispute, the economic analysis of law principle can be applied
to it. Hence, investment disputes or trade disputes are not suitable for
applying doctrines such as humanitarian consideration or margin of
appreciation unless an explicit treaty provision exists.
3.

The Public Interest in International Investment Law

3.1. The Debate on the Concept of Public Interest
Above, the relevance of the public interest in the context of defining what constitutes an investment was partially addressed. In this
chapter, the issue will be comprehensively reviewed. As basic
sources of international law, provisions in treaties and rules of customary international law do not involve a uniform phrase about the
public interest. Putting aside various usages, frequently utilized
phrases are such things as public (national) security, public purpose,
and public interest.117 States aim to provide broader regulatory freedom by placing such clauses in international treaties.118 A State’s
right to regulate concerning the public interest has a different basis
compared to the doctrines of state of necessity, national security, and
public order.119 Nevertheless, even if a BIT does not involve a public
interest exception clause, some assert that arbitral tribunals may consider public interest review through their reliance on past arbitral decisions rather than interpreting the relevant expression in a BIT.120 By
117. PEDRO J. MARTINEZ-FRAGA & C. RYAN REETZ, PUBLIC PURPOSE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW RETHINKING REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY IN THE
GLOBAL ERA, 126 (2015).
118. Id. at 124-125.
119. AIKATERINI TITI, THE RIGHT TO REGULATE IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, 101 (2014). See also, Alison Giest, Interpreting Public Interest
Provisions in International Investment Treaties, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 334 (2017).
120. Giest, supra note 119, at 328. However, various authors object to adoption of precedents in international investment law. These authors assert that looking for consistency
in investment arbitration decisions is not suitable due to the type of dispute resolution.
Irene M. Ten Cate, The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L., 418, 421-422 (2013). See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Principles of Treaty Interpretation in the NAFTA Arbitral Award on Canadian
Cattlemen, 26 J. INT’L ARB., 159, 168-169 (2009). See also Stephan W. Schill, En-
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contrast, Aikaterini Titi’s comment on this issue is much more cautious. According to Titi, if investment agreements have unambiguous
public interest provisions, arbitrators must show deference to the host
States’ regulations regarding the investment. If treaties do not involve
such clauses, however, there is no mandatory situation for the tribunals concerning whether to allow broader regulatory freedom for
States.121
Another part of the public interest regulation matter is possible
demands for compensation. For clarification, it must be admitted that
public interest exception clauses in international investment agreements or treaties do not grant absolute police power to the host States
for regulation of foreign investments. The Marvin Feldman v. Mexico
case is a unique example to understand that question. In this dispute,
the Tribunal acknowledged that governments have many ways to reduce the economic profit of businesses, which could be done through
“confiscatory taxation, denial of access to infrastructure or necessary
raw materials, and the imposition of unreasonable regulatory regimes.”122 The Tribunal also indicated that if reasonable governmental regulations such as bona fide general taxation or alternative actions can be accepted as a non-discriminatory treatment, they are
within the regulatory power of governments and do not trigger State
liability.123 Consequently, when a State undertakes international obligations through investment treaties, it limits regulatory power, which
originated from its sovereignty. As such, if a State goes beyond reasonable regulation according to the relevant public interest provision
in a treaty or in general international law, it will be exposed to liability to the investor.124 To justly determine this distinction, arbitral tribunals should consider various factors such as aims and characteris-

121.
122.

123.

124.

hancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological
Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 79, 84 (2011) (describing arbitral decisions which deny accepting precedents).
Titi, supra note 119, at 71.
Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/99/1,
Award,
¶
103
(Dec.
16,
2002),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0319.pdf
[hereinafter
Feldman].
Id. (stating that “[r]easonable governmental regulation of this type cannot be achieved
if any business that is adversely affected may seek compensation, and it is safe to say
that customary international law recognizes this”). See also Titi, supra note 119, at 34.
See TRINH HAI YEN, THE INTERPRETATION OF INVESTMENT TREATIES, 183 (2014).
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tics of the measures or proportionality between public interests and
private interests. Those legal indicators determine which government
actions or measures count as indirect expropriation.125
A valuable critique directed to the public interest concept is its
ineffectiveness in international adjudication. Pursuant to the main
idea of that critique, international law is based on the consensual regime, and, except for very few peremptory norms, States are free to
make an agreement.126 Therefore, international law cannot adequately
protect public interests because of its consensual structure. Governments always have a chance to back down from their international
obligations by repealing treaties.127 Thus, Vaughan Lowe considers
that protecting public interests is a struggle which can be realizable in
the domestic legal arena rather than the international arena. 128 With
regard to ineffectiveness of the public interest idea in international
investment law, there is concern international tribunals may curtail
the regulatory power of governments, especially for regulations undertaken to protect the environment or human rights.129 There are insufficient sources that take into account the public interest as applicable law in treaty-based investment arbitration. Therefore, tribunals
hesitate to consider the public interest function because their decisions would risk annulment.130
3.2. Public Participation and Transparency in Investor-State Arbitration
One of the dimensions of the public interest concept reflects itself in the rising transparency trend in the international investment
regime. The struggle between privacy and transparency in investment
arbitration originates from the mixed structure of its proceedings,
which involves features from both public international arbitration and

125. Id. at 225.
126. Vaughan Lowe, Private Disputes and the Public Interest in International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, 3, 13 (Duncan French et al., eds.,
2010). See Brower, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 372.
127. Lowe, supra note 126, at 15.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’
Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest - The Concept of Proportionality, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, 75, 76
(Stephan W. Schill. ed., 2010).
130. Brower, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 372.
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private international commercial arbitration.131 However, some developments in investment arbitration have decreased confidentiality
in the proceedings.132 These developments can be construed as acceptance of broader transparency and underline the importance of
representing the public interest in investor-State arbitration.133 Indeed,
besides opening judicial proceedings to the public, transparency separates investor-State arbitration from commercial arbitrations. For example, the ICSID Secretariat routinely registers cases and provides
information to the public unlike other arbitral institutes such as the
ICC, LCIA, and SCC. During the 1980s, scholars complained about
the confidentiality of the awards; however, most of the awards are
now available to the public in accordance with Article 48(4) of the
ICSID Arbitration Rules..134 To further transparency in proceedings,
the UN General Assembly recently adopted the UNCITRAL Rules
on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration.135 The
UN General Assembly then adopted the United Nations Convention
on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, which
entered into force on October 18, 2017.136 In accordance with Article
131. See Sundaresh Menon, The Transnational Protection of Private Rights: Issues, Challenges, and Possible Solutions, in PRACTISING VIRTUE INSIDE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, 17, 32 (David D. Caron et al. eds., 2015); Alessandra Asteriti & Christian J. Tams, Transparency and Representation of the Public Interest in Investment
Treaty Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC
LAW, 787, 788 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010).
132. See, e.g., U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL RULES ON
TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION art. 6, at 10 (Apr. 1,
2014),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-ontransparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency]; U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE [USTR], 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL
INVESTMENT
TREATY
art.
29(1)-(2),
at
32
(2012),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model
BIT].
133. Ruth Teitelbaum, A Look at The Public Interest in Investment Arbitration: Is It
Unique? What Should We Do About It? 5 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. PUBLICIST, 54, 55
(2010).
134. Asteriti and Tams, supra note 131, at 790. The authors categorize the views about
confidentiality in investor-state arbitration under three subheadings; the orthodox approach, moderate orthodox approach and unorthodox approach, id. at 789-92. They
considered the ICSID rules under moderate orthodoxy view subheading, id. at 790-91.
135. U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 68th plen. mtg. para. 3, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/109 (Dec.
18, 2013).
136. U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., 68th plen. mtg. para. 2, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/69/116 (Dec.
10, 2014). To date, the Convention (also known as the Mauritius Convention) has been
signed by 23 States, including the United States. Only five States (Canada, Switzer-
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2(1) of the Convention, the “UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency
shall apply to any investor-State arbitration, whether or not initiated
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” unless the respondent State
has not made a reservation as a Party of the Convention. According
to Article 6, hearings must be public unless there is a confidentiality
exception or a need to protect information. Despite these gains, as a
rule, ICSID hearings are confidential Nevertheless, “unless either
party objects, the Tribunal, after consultation with the SecretaryGeneral, may allow other persons” to participate in the hearings.137
Clearly, the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency go beyond the
ICSID Arbitration Rules and take care of the public interest as an essential point in tribunal proceedings.138
Another dimension of the public interest debate is its clash with
the common interest in international law. The rising trend in regard to
universal human values actually empowers the common interest of
the international community against national public interests.139 For
example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recognized the
common interest concept, and it determined that “the object and purpose of the [American Convention on Human Rights] is not the exchange of the reciprocal rights between a limited number of States,
but the protection of the human rights of all individual human beings
within the Americas, irrespective of their nationality.”140 Similarly,
there is increased acceptance of the independence of human rights issues in the doctrine, although these rights are reciprocal to those of

137.

138.
139.
140.

land, Cameroon, Gambia, and Mauritius) have ratified the Convention thus far. Status
of
Treaties,
U.N.
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXII3&chapter=22&lang=en. (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). See also U.N. Convention on
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, Feb. 19, 2015, 54 I.L.M. 751
[hereinafter Mauritius Convention].
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES [ICSID],
ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES r. 32(2), at 115 (2006),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf
[hereinafter ICSID ARBITRATION RULES].
See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency, supra note 132 art. 1(4), at 6.
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT
11 (2004).
The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on
Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) No. 2, ¶ 27 (Sept. 24, 1982).
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the States.141 Bruno Simma commented more generally and concluded international law is entering a new stage where it eliminates the
distinctions between governments; instead, it raises the pillar of
common interests that belong to the whole international community.142 Likewise, Louis Henkin agrees that universal human values
gradually have superseded nation-State values in international law.143
This thought also was demonstrated by Thomas Joseph Lawrence approximately one hundred years ago. He indicated that nations chased
their interest naturally, but he asserted the policymakers should go
beyond the public interest and make a more fair and well-founded international system.144 He also pointed out it was a mistake to debate
global controversies with patriotic sentiment, and he considered such
disagreements national issues rather than international.145
Investment disputes involve interest conflict between investors
and States. However, in some instances regarding environmental issues or human rights, common interests of the international community become relevant.146 Arbitral tribunals may tend to take into consideration “common interest” arguments as far as their relevance with
parties’ benefits. However, increasing amicus curiae submissions and
allegations of violation concerning rules of the environment protection and human rights in foreign investment cases reflect that “common interest” concept applicable to the international investment
law.147 Even though, so far in the practice of investment arbitrations,
defenses of States have not been progressed concerning the preservation of public interest due to human rights consideration. Likewise,
amicus curiae submissions mostly lack justification about the public

141. See Yoshifumi Tanaka, Protection of Community Interests in International Law: The
Case of the Law of the Sea, 15 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 329, 334-335 (2011).
142. Bruno Simma, Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L., 265, 268 (2009).
143. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.,
31, 32-33 (1995).
144. THOMAS JOSEPH LAWRANCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 15 (1910).
145. Id. at 101.
146. Christoph Schreuer & Ursula Kriebaum, From Individual to Community Interest in
International Investment Law, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY
INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA, 1080 (Ulrich
Fastenrath, et al. eds., 2011).
147. Id. at 1096.
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interest concerns relating to the facts of disputes.148 Amicus curiae
submissions may be accepted by the tribunals after consultations with
parties of the dispute. There are some requirements in the nondisputing party submissions which should be satisfied. First, such a
submission must assist the tribunal in the decision making of a factual or legal matter. Second, it must address the matter within the scope
of a dispute. Third, a non-disputing party must have a substantial interest in the proceeding.149 In the first drafts of 2006 amendments to
ICSID Arbitration Rules article 37(2), non-disputing party defines as
a “person or State.” This wording, however, was found too restrictive
and changed as “person or entity.” There is no doubt that the “entity”
term encompasses the States.150 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency
elaborates the issue and separates the provisions as “submission by a
third person” (art. 4) and “submission by a non-disputing party to the
treaty” (art. 5). “Submission of a non-disputing party” also exist effects on the investment dispute. In this case, the Tribunal reviewed
each relevant measure adopted in other fields of international law in
addition to the investment law. In ECtHR, ICC, ICTY, and ICTR allow participation of Contracting States, organizations and persons as
148. Diane A. Desierto, Public Policy in International Investment and Trade Law: Community Expectations and Functional Decision-Making, 26 FLA. J. INT’L L. 87 (2014).
The author gives the example of Suez v. Argentine case. In that case, Argentine and the
amicus curiae submissions asserted that population’s right to water enables ignoring
the obligations under the BITs even if those treaties do not contain such necessity
clauses. But the tribunal did not agree to this claim because neither BITs nor international law provides an opportunity like that. In the view of the tribunal, human rights
and investment treaty obligations are respectively considerable and equal. Therefore,
they are not inconsistent or contradictory. See, Suez v. Argentine, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (2010), ¶ 262. I am of the opinion that the conclusion
of the tribunal is correct, but it missed some features of the relationship between human rights and investment law. Both field separately exists under the international law,
but it does not mean that their obligations could not be rival or competitor in some disputes. Therefore, there is a need for explanation in such circumstances about the competing obligations and which one is more relevant in the context of the dispute. Admittedly, it is crucial to choose the correct judicial body for the case either human rights
court or investment arbitration tribunal in such a dispute.
149. See, Article 37(2) of ICSID Arbitration Rules. “UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency
in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration” preserves first and third requirements however it excludes the second requirement in the determination of acceptance the written
submission of a non-disputing party. See, Article 4(3) of UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency.
150. Eloise Obadia, Extension of Proceedings Beyond the Original Parties: Non-Disputing
Party Participation in Investment Arbitration, 22 ICSID Rev/FILJ, 368 (2007).
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amicus curiae, however, ICJ and ITLOS only accept States and international organizations for written submissions in advisory opinions or
contentious proceedings as amicus curiae.151
Positive sides of third-party submissions are enumerated as their
assistance to provide predictability and stability of investment arbitration and to find the correct interpretation of the treaty.152 Also, there
is another benefit which is asserted about the amicus curiae submissions concerning their potential role in the preclusion of fragmentation in international law.153 AES v. Hungary case is exemplified in the
doctrine regarding this assertion154 which the European Commission’s amicus curiae submission had been taken into consideration by
the tribunal regarding the European Union’s (EU) position about the
disagreement.155 Thus, self-contained regimes may more easily reconcile in international law with each other such as EU law and investment law in that case. Last, maybe the most prominent argument
which has been claimed by the favors of third-party submissions is it
will serve more accountability in investor-State arbitration and eliminate public concerns.156
To the contrary, opponents of third-party submissions argue that
respondent States can represent the public interest and there is no
need for NGO’s participation in the proceedings. Moreover, NGO’s
specific agendas could expand the dispute context.157 For example, in
“Methanex v. United States of America” case, unlike the U.S. Government arguments about public health concerning undertaken
measures, NGO’s maintained that environmental issues exist in the
dispute.158 In my view, probably for that reason, unlike ICSID Rules,
151. Lance Bartholomeusz, The Amicus Curiae Before International Courts and Tribunals,
5 NON-STATE ACTORS & INT’L L. 275 (2005).
152. Tarcisio Gazzini, INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES, 345 (2016).
153. Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 218
(2011).
154. Id. at 217.
155. AES Summit Generation Limited AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, ¶ 8.2 (Sep. 23, 2010).
156. Kyla Tienhaara, Third Party Participation in Investment-Environment Disputes: Recent Developments, 16(2) REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 239 (2007).
157. Id. See also, Levine, supra note 153, at 215.
158. Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae,” ¶¶ 6-8 (Jan. 15,
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UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency excluded one of the acceptance
requirements of arbitral tribunals about the third-party submissions
which require non-disputing parties addressing the issue within the
context of the dispute.159 Hence, it will be easier to accept amicus curiae submissions for arbitral tribunals. Another counter-argument
against transparency is that it has a potential risk, through public proceedings, of disclosing confidential information such as the trade secrets of investors.160 There is also a discrete critique which asserts
that third-party participations may increase the length and process of
investor-State arbitrations.161
Consequently, the rising demand for transparency and admittance of “public interest” existence in the litigations affects the new
rules in international investment arbitration. However, consideration
of “public interests” always does not guarantee or justify interventions to the investors by the host States. For instance, in the dispute of
“Santa Elena v. Costa Rica,” the Tribunal explicitly pointed out that
even if an expropriation of investment has been carrying out for environmental reasons, it does not change the legal character of adequate
compensation.162 According to the Tribunal “public purposes” concerning environmental issues do not affect the duty to pay compensation for expropriation of investor’s property.163 Kulick commented
that the majority of the investment tribunals endorsed (global) public
interest considerations either weakly or strongly. Nevertheless,
Metalclad, Santa Elena, and Tecmed Tribunals denied holding up environmental concerns against investor rights.164 Regarding the compensation issue, when we look at the Article 13 of the Energy Charter
Treaty and Article 1110 of the NAFTA, these provisions regulate that

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

2001). It had been emphasized in the submissions that there is a need for amicus participation for preventing the failure to consider environmental and sustainable development goals such as happened in “Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States”
case which known as very restrictive decision about the regulation power of States.
Also, it was argued in the submissions that the dispute is concerning the balance between the implementation of environmental regulations and investor’s property rights.
See, supra note 149.
Tienhaara, supra note 156, at 240, Levine, supra note 153, at 220.
Id.
Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, (2000), ICSID
Rev/FILJ, ¶71 at 192.
Id. ¶72 at 192.
ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, 262 (2012).
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requirements of “nationalization or expropriation of an investment”
and “a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of an
investment.” Thus, such a measure must be “for a purpose which is in
the public interest, non-discriminatory, carried out under due process
of law and accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.”165
There is a remarkable critique which defends the common concerns of the international community and asserts that such disputes
are unsuitable for arbitration because of arbitrators are appointed by
the disputing parties with private contracts and cannot pretend like
impartial judges in State courts. Against that critique, some authors
think that arbitrators are impartial and independent dispute resolvers
who interpret and apply the law and are subject to various mechanisms that can prevent private interests from taking precedence over
public interests.166 Schill suggests analyzing investment law with the
glasses of comparative public law which involves domestic public
law and other branches of international law as well.167 For instance,
the author explained that the principle of proportionality, which is derived from national public laws for the purpose of providing a balance between investor protection and public interests, can accommodate non-investment concerns and protect of investors’ rights.168
4.

The Proportionality in International Law

4.1. The Proportionality Analysis and Its Reflections under the
Sub-Branches of International Law
In international law, proportionality emerges as one of the “general principles of law” or as a rule of “customary international law”
or as a “treaty provision” depending on the context of the regime. 169
In terms of some branches of international law, the “proportionality”
plays a significant role in settlement of disputes like the “use of
165. Article 13 (1) of Energy Charter Treaty and article 1110 (1) of the NAFTA. See also
for explanations; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 835 (2008).
166. Brower & Schill, supra note 89, at 489. See also, Yen, supra note 124, at 26. Justifiably, the author pointed delaying attempts of respondents regarding the proceedings by
proposing disqualification of an arbitrator. So that, such disqualification proposals do
not always withstand suspicion about the impartiality of the arbitrators.
167. Schill, supra note 120, at 85.
168. Id. at 98.
169. GEBHARD BÜCHELER, PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION, 67 (2015).
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force”.170 Higgins also evaluated the proportionality concept under
the different sub-branches of international law. The author prominently indicated that proportionality plays a vital role especially in
the maritime delimitation and the use of force. Also added that it is a
well-accepted principle in the doctrine under the jus in bello concerning its transformation to the specific rules according to the Protocols
of 1949 Geneva Conventions. Human rights law is another area
which proportionality has been used as a criterion for restriction of
freedom, and it has a separate meaning beside necessity (in democratic societies).171
Each regime under the international law has its particular assessment method of proportionality. Admittedly, there are standard
features about this principle, but that does not mean there is a “proportionality test” which is tailored for application to all special regimes in international law. 172 The common features (or requirements)
of the “proportionality analysis” involves four steps. The first step is
that the measure which was undertaken by the State must have a
proper purpose, second that the chosen measure and the purpose must
have a rational link, and third that the chosen measure must be necessary. It means that there must be no other eligible measure for reaching to the same purpose. The fourth and last step is making a balance
between public interest and private interest in a strict manner (stricto
sensu).173

170. Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law,
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715 (2008). (The principle of proportionality does not only
emerge in the armed conflicts but also in the trade or investment disputes and the restriction of human rights.). See also, Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 391 (1993).
171. Higgins, supra note 139, 236-237. Higgins also indicated her skepticism about the
principle and considered that the status of proportionality as a “general principle of
law” is doubtful. Moreover, the author thought that even though the proportionality
principle has an essential role in the delimitation of maritime boundaries with the equity principle, it still has full of uncertainties. Id. at 230.
172. See, Ulf Linderfalk, Towards A More Constructive Analysis of the Identity of Special
Regimes in International Law-The Case of Proportionality, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 874-878 (2013).
173. AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
THEIR LIMITATIONS, 3 (2012). See also, Sweet & Cananea, supra note 25, at 917918. Except for the Barak’s book, in the various studies about the proportionality, authors prefer combining two conditions as one condition; so that, their proportionality
analysis involves three steps.

250

ILS Journal of International Law

Vol. VI, No. 2

Neither investment arbitration tribunals174 nor WTO judicial bodies175 rigorously apply “proportionality analysis” devoted to its steps.
Instead, they utilize this principle pragmatically and more in an uncomplicated manner. However, this pragmatic approach has been
criticized by various authors. About the issue, Tecmed v. Mexico case
is very familiar to the international lawyers. The main point of the
dispute is the rejection of authorization renewal to operate the landfill
by “National Ecology Institute of Mexico” (INE) which is an agency
within the Ministry of Environment.176 In that case, the arbitral tribunal points out that the exigency of reasonable relationship in proportionality between the weight imposed on the foreign investor and the
aim expected from the expropriation measure. The Tribunal quoted
from ECtHR decisions and indicated that unlike nationals, nonnationals are more defenseless against the host State’s legislation and
actions. In this manner, different considerations may apply to nonnationals in terms of “public interest” concept. Thus, it is possible
that to bear a greater burden to nationals concerning the “public interest.”177 The Tribunal also considered that political situations arising from public pressure justified the State’s resolution.178 However,
it concluded that the respondent State did not present any evidence
regarding community opposition about consequences of the operation
of the Landfill on the environment or the public health.179 Moreover,
the Tribunal reviewed the “fair and equitable treatment” as an
expression and part of “good faith” (bona fide) principle and,
considered that “Article 4(1) of the Spain-Mexico BIT” requires the
“Contracting Parties to provide to international investments treatment
that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into
account by the foreign investor to make the investment.”180 Thus, the
foreign investor expects that the host State to act consistently not arbitrarily. Also, the investor may know beforehand “any rules and
174. See, Prabhash Ranjan, Using the Public Law Concept of Proportionality to Balance
Investment Protection with Regulation in International Investment Law: A Critical
Appraisal, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 864 (2014).
175. Bücheler, supra note 169, at 70.
176. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, ¶¶ 36, 39 (May 29, 2003).
177. Id. at 122.
178. Id. at 128.
179. Id. at 144.
180. Id. at 153-154.
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regulations as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices which will govern its investments.” Therefore, the
government must not arbitrarily revoke any past decision or permission which the investor trusted and planned its commercial or business activities.181
The Tribunal’s decision is criticized in the doctrine because it
bypassed some elements of the proportionality analysis such as appraising the necessity of the measure.182 There is another critique
about the comprehension of “public interest” by the Tribunal which
was asserted that it occurred in a local way. As stated in the detailed
critique by Kulick, despite quoting Santa Elena decision concerning
the “public interest” existence does not affect the compensation obligation,183 the Tecmed Tribunal constructed its reasoning on the idea
of “public interest” is an internal concept which serves the interest of
the national community.184 Thus, according to Kulick, the Tribunal
concluded that there is a requirement of different treatment to domestic investors rather than the foreign investors with regards to participating public interest.185 Lastly, maybe the most prominent critique is
about the appraisements by the Tecmed Tribunal concerning the “fair
and equitable treatment.” According to Crawford, this is an attempt
which aiming to rewrite the standard of “fair and equitable treatment”
through referring to the hypothetical expectations instead of the specific expectations derived from the facts of each case. Therefore, he
called that approach as a “utopian standard” which many governments will fail to meet it.186 In relation to the subject, it may be said
that the standard of “legitimate expectations” which is a useful guide
for investment tribunals expanded through that decision.
The standard of “legitimate expectations” is a part of the general
principle of “legal certainty” in EU Law and ECHR Law which de181. Id. at 154.
182. See, Caroline Henckels, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting
Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration, 15
J. INT’L ECON. L. 232-233 (2012). See also, Ranjan, supra note 174, at 865.
183. See, Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, supra note 176, ¶ 121.
184. Kulick, supra note 164, at 247, 248.
185. Id. at 248. (The author defends that the tribunal’s consideration did not coincide with
globalized economy’s facts. Indeed, a company despite it has the foreign nationality,
can have stronger economic relations in another country.).
186. JAMES
CRAWFORD,
BROWNLIE’S
PRINCIPLES
OF
PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 615 (2012).
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rived from domestic laws.187 For the ECtHR, enacting statutes for the
expropriation of properties mostly have “public interest” including
the consideration of political, economic and social issues. It seems
that the Court recognizes a wide margin of appreciation for national
authorities beforehand. However, it also adds that if legislature’s decision has no reasonable foundation about what is the public interest,
legitimate expectations of the relevant person may be infringed. 188
Furthermore, the ECtHR has indicated in its various decisions that an
applicant have a “legitimate expectation” which “must be of nature,
more concrete than a mere hope and be based on a legal provision or
a legal act” according to the proper interpretation and implementation
of the national law.189 Concerning the matter, the Stretch v. The United Kingdom case has some resemblances with Tecmed case in terms
of facts and the conclusion.190 As noted by various writers, the standard of legitimate expectations albeit it has some differences under the
separate legal regimes such as national laws, ECHR law, and investment law, it preserves its core elements under each regime.191
187. VENICE COMMISSION OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, RULE OF LAW
CHECKLIST 26 (2016). The Venice Commission evaluates the principle of “legal certainty” under eight sub-headings including the “legitimate expectations.” Indeed, from
the context of international investment law, it is also a fact that the “rule of law,” “independent and efficient judicial system,” and the “legal certainty” are critical elements
of the favorable investment climate in a country. See, Herdegen, supra note 1, at 354.
188. See, e.g., James and Others v. The United Kingdom, 98-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3233 ¶ 46 (1986); N.K.M. v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 37 (2013).
189. See, e.g., Béláné Nagy v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 75 (2016); Trgo v. Croatia, Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶ 41 (2009); Maurice v. France, 2005-IX, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 63; Kopecký v. Slovakia, 2004-IX, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50; Pressos Companía Naviera S.A. v. Belgium, 332
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 ¶ 29 (1995); Pine Valley Developments Ltd and Others v.
Ireland, 222 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 ¶ 51 (1991).
190. See, Stretch v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 33-35 (2003). The applicant, in
that case, contracted to lease land from Dorchester Council for a term of 22 years. The
lease contract contains an option for renewal for 21 years. Although the applicant gave
notice for exercising that option, West Dorset Council who is the successor of the
Dorchester as a local authority had considered that its predecessor acted ultra vires
while granting the option. Hence, according to the Council, the renewal option was invalid. The approach of West Dorset Council was recognized by the English courts
likewise. By contrast that, the ECtHR determined that neither party of the agreement
had been aware of any legal obstacle when they were dealing the option. Therefore,
the Court considered that the applicant had a legitimate expectation for the exercising
of renewal option regarding the purposes of “Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
ECHR.”
191. See, e.g., Rimantas Daujotas & Ramūnas Audzevičius, The Concept of Legitimate Expectation in Investor-State Arbitration and the European Court of Human Rights, 6
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Similar to Crawford, Schill evaluated that the reasoning of the
Tecmed Tribunal has a severe weakness concerning the interpretation
of “fair and equitable treatment.” For the author, interpretation of
“fair and equitable treatment” in the Tecmed case is acceptable but
not a necessary one.192 In that vein, some tribunals have followed up
the path of Tecmed Tribunal. However, the Saluka Tribunal adopted
more refined approach regarding the interpretation of “fair and equitable treatment.”193 The Tribunal indicated that the expectations of
foreign investors include fundamental standards such as “good faith,”
“due process,” and “non-discrimination.”194 However, it observed that
if these terms are taken too literally, “host States’ obligations would
be inappropriate and unrealistic.” The “fair and equitable treatment”
standard cannot solely be specified by foreign investors’ subjective
considerations.195 No investor may rationally expect that the conditions at the time of making the investment maintain without alteration. For determination of whether there is an infringement of inves-

192.
193.
194.
195.

Вестник Международного Коммерческого Арбитража (Bulletin of the International
Commercial
Arbitration),
12
(2012)
Available
at
SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2197157; Michele Potestà, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID Rev/FILJ, 121 (2013). Compare, ROLAND KLAGER, ‘FAIR AND
EQUITABLE TREATMENT’ IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, 164,
187 (2011). Klager points out that investment tribunals have not established yet comprehensive criteria relating the conflict between investors’ legitimate expectations and
host States’ public interests. Trevor Zeyl, Charting the Wrong Course: The Doctrine of
Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law, 49 ALBERTA L. REV. 226, 234235 (2011). Zeyl acknowledges the core elements of the “legitimate expectations” are
same in the each one of legal regimes. However, he criticizes the way of implementation of that standard because of against it there are various restrictive doctrines in the
domestic laws such as ultra vires principle and separation of powers doctrine, although, investment tribunals have not applied such restriction. Cf. Sornarajah, supra
note 62, at 354-355. Sornarajah opposes the view that the standard of “legitimate expectations” is derived from domestic laws and it can be acknowledged as a “general
principle of law.” According to him, that standard has rarely been used as a substantive
principle because of the practical difficulties during the proceedings. Therefore, Sornarajah asserts that “legitimate expectations” only provide procedural protection under the English law, so that, it has been used as a substantive rule by ICSID tribunals
for justifying their Awards concerning the damages caused by the breach of BITs.
STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, 335 (2009).
Id. at 337.
Saluka Investments B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 303
(Mar. 17, 2006).
Id. ¶ 304.
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tors’ legitimate and reasonable expectations, public interest considerations also must be taken into account by the tribunals concerning the
host States’ regulation process.196 Thus, the Saluka Tribunal emphasized the importance of proportionality between “investors’ expectations” and “public interest considerations” of States. Parallel to the
inference of “investment conditions would not maintain without
change,” the Duke v. Ecuador,197 Bayindir v. Pakistan,198 and Occidental v. Ecuador199 Tribunals prominently noted investors must take
into account all circumstances of the host State.200
Unlike the Tecmed Tribunal, in the dispute of Occidental v. Ecuador, the Tribunal evaluated the “necessity of the measure” in the
proportionality test. However, it has also mentioned and has been
influenced by the Tecmed Award in its judgment.201 The Tribunal reviewed that whether the Ecuador administration has any other option
except Caducidad (Expiration) Decree or not. Then the Tribunal considered that there are some options could be made by Ecuador; therefore, it found that respondent’s argument is invalid.202 The same issue
was discussed in the annulment proceeding also. Ecuador claimed
that the principle of proportionality has not been included by the Par196. Id. ¶ 305.
197. According to the tribunal “the assessment of the reasonableness or legitimacy must
take into account all circumstances, including not only the facts surrounding the investment, but also the political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions prevailing in the host State.” Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, ¶ 340 (Aug. 18, 2008). The
tribunal also bore in mind that the duty to meet the “legitimate expectations” of the investor and population of the State through establishing certainty in the “rule of law.” It
is understood from that explanation, so as the Tribunal took into consideration of the
reality that standard of “legitimate expectations” is a part of “legal certainty” under the
“rule of law.” Id, ¶ 117.
198. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/29 Award, ¶179 (Aug. 27, 2009). In that dispute, the tribunal reviewed the expectations of investors, in-depth relating whether recognized as legitimate or not. In this context, the tribunal determined the claimant was aware fragility of
the political conditions in Pakistan. The claimant also admitted that it was aware of the
potential adverse effect of a change in government. Therefore, the tribunal did not accept the allegation of investor’s legitimate expectations be frustrated. Id. ¶¶ 193-199.
199. Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, ¶383 (Oct. 5,
2012). The Tribunal denied the claimants’ assertation regarding the Caducidad Decree
frustrated their legitimate expectations.
200. Potestà, supra note 191, at 118-119.
201. Occidental v. Ecuador, supra note 199, ¶¶ 406-409.
202. Id. ¶¶ 428-436.
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ticipation Contract, Ecuadorian law, or in customary international
law. But the ad hoc Committee did not agree with this argument
about the existence of the “error of laws.”203 Unlike, it shared the
same idea about the Tribunal’s findings that the Ecuadorian law and
international law contained the principle of proportionality as a general principle of punitive and tort law.204
When switching the scope of review from investment case law to
WTO jurisprudence, coming across sophisticated issues is inevitable.
Andenas and Zleptnig pointed out that balancing interests through
WTO Agreements is a complicated process and requires comparative
research about the proportionality.205 The complexity is originated
from the critical mission which is aiming to accomplish the balance
between trade interests and non-trade interests.206 The Korea-Beef
case is an excellent example for reviewing WTO jurisprudence about
the proportionality. In that dispute, Korea implemented a quota, dual
retail system, and other measures related to importation beef products
then defended all of the measures by saying that they were consistent
with GATT 1994.207 The panel applied proportionality analysis regarding the dual retail system. However, as mentioned above,208 it did
not pursue the steps of the proportionality analysis. Directly, the panel examined the dual retail system and concluded that this implementation was beyond the goals of Korean Unfair Competition Act.
Therefore, it decided that dual retail system regarding the importation
of beef products is disproportionate measure and it could not be
justified by “Article XX(d) of GATT.”209 In the Appellate Body
phase of the proceedings, Korea claimed that the panel erred in the
applying Article XX(d) of GATT. According to the Korean government’s consideration, there is no alternative measure would provide
203. Occidental v. Ecuador, Decision on Annulment of the Award, ¶ 349 (Nov. 2, 2015).
However, the Committee partially annulled the Award because of the error in the ratione personae jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned transference of %40 shares by
claimant into a new investor. See, Id. ¶¶ 257-272.
204. Id. ¶ 350.
205. Mads Andenas & Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality: WTO Law: in Comparative Perspective, 42 TEX. INT’L L. J. 374 (2007).
206. Id. at 377.
207. Panel Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef,
WTO Doc. WT/DS161/R WT/DS169/R (adopted Jul. 31, 2000) ¶¶ 62, 146-150. (hereinafter Korea-Beef Panel Report).
208. See, supra at 30-31.
209. Korea-Beef Panel Report, ¶¶ 496, 675-676.
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the same conclusion about combating fraud in the market of beef
products except the dual retail system.210 Nevertheless, the Appellate
Body did not accept that claim.211 Thus, the panel’s decision which
accepting the dual retail system as a disproportionate measure approved by the Appellate Body.
4.2. Use of Force and The Principle of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality has a different meaning in the
use of force compared to other sub-branches of international law in
terms of limitation harming others.212 Hence, in jus ad bellum, proportionality is not a decisive factor in some situations concerning
which States can legitimately resort to force. Instead, it observes the
way of use of force which is applied.213
Proportionality has become a more important principle in the law
of the sea related to the use of force. Recent cases in that field have
proved this reality. The arbitration practice under Annex VII of
UNCLOS and ITLOS cases have some examples. The “M/V Saiga
(No. 2)” case which is the first dispute submitted to the ITLOS contains excessive use of force allegation. The ITLOS explicitly stated in
the judgment that coastal authorities must avoid excessive use of
force which is beyond the reasonable and necessary circumstances. 214
Afterward, the Tribunal decided that when respondent State’s (Guinean) officers used their guns, they did not act carefully about the safety of the ship and the human life on board due to the two persons’ injuries and significant damages on board. Thus, the Tribunal found
that Guinea violated flag State’s (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)
rights under the international law.215 By such decisions, arise a view
that the “considerations of humanity” increasingly has been displayed
in the proportionality test regarding jus ad bellum conflicts.216 The
“Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation of 1988” has specific
provisions concerning that matter. Article 8bis (9) rules that “under
210. Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, WTO Doc. WT/DS161/R WT/DS169/R (adopted Dec. 11, 2000) ¶ 175.
211. Id. ¶ 180.
212. Higgins, supra note 139, 230.
213. Judith Gardam, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE
BY STATES, 20 (2003).
214. See, supra note 109.
215. Id. 158-159.
216. See, Gardam, supra note 213, at 209.
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this article, the use of force must be avoided except when necessary
to ensure the safety of officials and persons on board. Any use of
force according to this article must not exceed the minimum degree
of force which is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.”
Outside the context of that provision, the “law of the sea” tribunals
have determined that boarding to a vessel and then using excessive
force against persons on board would violate international law.217
Arbitral tribunals which are constituted under the Annex VII of
UNCLOS has continued the ITLOS’ approach in their cases. For instance, Annex VII arbitral tribunal in the Arctic Sunrise case discussed the principles of reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality. The claimant (Netherlands) in that case argued that respondent’s
(Russia) actions about suppression to protests in the sea must be reasonable and when they used force, it is essential to obey customary
law principles of necessity and proportionality.218 Annex VII Tribunal
accepted that for the protection of their sovereign rights, coastal
States might undertake appropriate measures pursuant to their legitimate aim. Also, the Tribunal indicated that such measures must fulfill
the requirements of the principles of reasonableness, necessity, and
proportionality.219 However, the Tribunal identified some breaches
under the UNCLOS regarding unlawful boarding, seizure, and detention of the vessel; so that, it concluded that there is no need to consider the reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality of relevant
measures undertaken by respondent.220

217. ANDREW CLAPHAM, BRIERLY’S LAW OF NATIONS, 231 (2014).
218. The “Arctic Sunrise Arbitration” (Netherlands v. Russia), Award on the Merits, 52, ¶
221 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) It must be mentioned one of the features of that argument.
The Netherlands have evaluated the proportionality as a part of the customary law, unlike Ecuador. However, in the Occidental v. Ecuador case, Ecuador asserted that customary law does not involve the principle of proportionality. See, supra note 203. That
difference between two arguments could be explained merely by the content of the
cases which belong to different special regimes under the international law. The nature
of a dispute can be able to alter the normative position of proportionality. If the proportionality principle is evaluated by an international judicial body in the context of
the “use of force,” it must be considered as a part of the customary law by virtue of the
ICJ’s jurisprudence. On the other hand, I think that the proportionality principle is acceptable as one of the “general principles of law” in other special regimes of international law such as the investment law, WTO law, and the delimitation of maritime
boundaries, under the Article 38/1(c) of the ICJ Statute.
219. Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, The Merits, 82, ¶ 326.
220. Id. 83, ¶ 333.
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More recently another dispute gives plenty of clues from the
standpoint of the “law of the sea” tribunals related the principle of
proportionality. The Annex VII Tribunal of the Duzgit Integrity case
reviewed the proportionality dispute between parties. First of all, the
Tribunal determined that Article 293 of UNCLOS permits to the
courts and tribunals for utilizing relevant general international law
rules and principles which not incompatible with UNCLOS. Notably,
it emphasized that the principle of reasonableness and its elements
which are principles of necessity and proportionality not only applicable in use of force cases but also covers law enforcement
measures.221 The substance of the concerned dispute was “ship to ship
transfer” and the disagreement between parties was originated from
alleged charges of smuggling concluded with the detention of vessel,
fines, and indemnification. The Tribunal considered that custom fines
imposed by the respondent (São Tomé) which amount more than a
one-million-euro were disproportionate. Moreover, it decided that the
detention of the vessel and the master, monetary sanctions, and confiscation of entire cargo was excessive compared to the alleged offenses.222
Abundant decisions rendered by various international judicial
bodies utilize the doctrine of proportionality as a general principle of
international law; nonetheless, the principle had preserved its vagueness as a legal norm until recently.223 However, it has achieved its legitimacy because of its frequent practice and has mostly wriggled out
its ambiguousness.224
4.3. The Principle of Proportionality as a Legal Balancing Tool
Between the Investors’ Rights and the Host States’ Public Interests
International investment agreements do not contain a proportionality analysis; nevertheless, investment tribunals review the cases
which they encountered regarding whether the disputes met the requirements of the proportionality principle.225 However, almost none
221. The Duzgit Integrity Arbitration (Malta v. São Tomé and Príncipe), Award, 54-55, ¶¶
208-210 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016).
222. Id. 69-71, ¶¶ 254-262.
223. Franck, supra note 170, at 716.
224. Id. at 718.
225. See, e.g., Bücheler, supra note 169, at 132; N. Jansen Calamita, The Principle of Proportionality and the Problem of Indeterminacy in International Investment Treaties, in
YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2013-2014,
372 (Andrea K. Bjorklund, ed., 2015).
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of the awards rendered by the arbitral tribunals explicitly resort to the
proportionality either as a “general principle of law” or a rule of “customary international law.”226 Nonetheless, in my opinion, the expanding impact of “public interest” concept in the investor-State arbitration, urges arbitral tribunals to resort the proportionality as a “general
principle of law.” Although some doubts have been asserted by the
various authors regarding the admittance of proportionality as a
general principle of law, such approach can change depending on the
acceptance of different views in the debate regarding roots of “the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” under the
“Article 38(1)(c) of Statute of the ICJ.”227
There are three views about the meaning of “Article 38(1)(c) of
Statute of ICJ/PCIJ.” The first view, which is expressed by various
authors such as Anzilotti, Castberg and, Morelli, claims that that provision primarily refers to the “general principles of international law”
and only in case of secondary situations it admits to obtaining from
domestic law principles of different States.228 The second view,
which is supported by Strupp and Scerni, argues that Article 38(1)(c)
can only refer to obtaining from domestic law principles.229 The third
view asserted by Lauterpacht claims that “the general principles of
law” are, in reality, recognized principles of private law, which are
applied both by the international tribunals and the States.230
226. Calamita, supra note 225, at 168.
227. Id. footnote 56. The author indicated the lack of acceptance of the proportionality
principle as a “general principle of law” in domestic laws outside of Europe and North
America, and he gave the example of China which does not recognize proportionality
in its constitutional & administrative law. However, a Chinese author expressed that
although the absence of proportionality principle in Chinese administrative law and its
Constitution, that principle can be found in Chinese traditional culture as a reflection
of moderation. Han Xiuli, On the Application of the Principle of Proportionality in
ICSID Arbitration and Proposals to Government of the People’s Republic of China, 13
James Cook U. L. Rev. 254 (2006). Moreover, Xiuli suggested to the Chinese government be more careful against BIT clauses regarding ICSID jurisdiction for reducing
the probability of implementation of the proportionality principle. He also recommended to the government for the pursuance of legitimate objectives against foreign
investors and application of regulatory investment measures according to the proportionality principle. Xiuli, at 257. For a suspicious view about the implementation of
proportionality as a general principle of law, see also, Higgins, supra note 139, at 230.
228. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, 2 (1987).
229. Id. at 3.
230. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 71, 85 (1927).
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In case of the acceptance of second or third view, the proportionality principle cannot be utilized under the “Article 38(1)(c) of ICJ
Statute.” Because as mentioned above, the proportionality test neither
exists in all civilized nations’ laws nor is admitted as a principle of
private law. However, if the first view is upheld, the proportionality
would be recognized as a “general principle of international law” especially in the event of an absence of a treaty provision. I think this
approach compatible with the draft history of the “Article 38(1)(c) of
ICJ/PCIJ Statute.” The Advisory Committee of PCIJ Statute bore in
mind while writing the provision that if the international law allows
applying only treaties and custom, it may force international judges
to commit “denial of justice” by declaring non-liquet.231
The arrangement of balance between investors’ rights and public
interest of States in expropriation provisions of investment agreements diverges from ECHR and national constitutions.232 Therefore,
that fact would not preclude the international arbitrators to construct
their proportionality concept in investment matters which have a different character than other legal regimes such as ECHR and national
constitutions. It does not mean that international investment arbitrators produced, an entirely new general principle of law. Instead, they
can incorporate a “general principle of law” from other legal systems
and apply the same principle in a different manner for providing
harmonization this concept with investment law.233
4.4. The Proportionality Analysis in Economic Exigency Situations
One of the arguments regarding the interpretation of “Article 25
of the ILC Draft 2001” is this provision implicitly involves “leastrestrictive-means test,” or “proportionality analysis.” Thus, that provision may be able to justify a wrongful act, if the relevant action is
the “only way” for the protection of the State’s vital interest. For this
reason, in economic exigency disputes before the investment tribunals, it is suggested the incorporation of the “proportionality analy231. Cheng, supra note 228, at 18.
232. BÜCHELER, supra note 169, at 135. The author also indicated that standard BIT provisions on expropriation had improved the investment protection compared to customary
international law implications such as Calvo doctrine and principle of national treatment. Thus, contemporary investment treaties have proved that the foreign investors
do not have to accept policy changes of the host States without compensation.
233. Sweet & Cananea, supra note 25, at 913.
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sis.”234 Another argument asserted by Bücheler is that the proportionality test cannot replace the “only way” test in Article 25. Bücheler
relies on the draft process of Article 25 in his argument because
travaux préparatoires shows that the necessity defense in customary
law usually comes into question in the disputes which contain the use
of force.235
Apart from that reason, the most important one is acknowledging
the “only way” requirement in Article 25 as a threshold which is
higher than the proportionality test. As a codified rule of customary
law, Article 25 intends to preclude States from their international obligations through necessity defense.236 Lastly, Bücheler suggests that
if States aim to provide a balance between the public interest and investors’ rights, it is the best way for them to carry out the incorporation of the NPM provisions in BITs.237 Otherwise, Article 25 would
become a “super-NPM clause” and begin to undermine BITs’ provisions in practice.238 Similarly, Sweet endorses the idea of utilizing the
proportionality test in the disputes related economic crisis such as the
Argentine cases.239 Beyond that, his inferences are remarkable about
the topic. Sweet draws attention to the possibility that the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals arguably bore in mind that their task is
based on the protection of the investments. Besides, he indicates that
the members of the tribunals might be hesitate to apply the proportionality analysis to refrain from acting like “balancing judge” rather

234. See generally Bjorklund, supra note 40, at 487. See also August Reinisch, Necessity
in International Investment Arbitration-An Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent
ICSID Cases? 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT AND TRADE, 200-01 (2007). Reinisch especially criticizes the LG&E decision because of the arbitral tribunal did not implement the
proportionality test regarding whether Argentine’s economic recovery package was
acceptable as the “only way” to cope with financial crisis. See LG&E v. Argentine,
supra note 20, at ¶ 257. Furthermore, he justifiably points out the risk of accepting the
disproportionate solutions as “only way” for the struggle with a crisis. But cf. Alvarez
& Khamsi, supra note 24, at 447. The authors assert that neither “Article XI” nor the
whole “U.S.- Argentine BIT” contains consideration of the proportionality for a balance between regulatory powers of states and the rights of foreign investors.
235. BÜCHELER, supra note 169, at 286.
236. Id. at 287.
237. Id. at 289.
238. Id. at 285.
239. Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 L. &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 48, 70 (2010).
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than “conventional arbitrators.”240 Consequently, after annulment decisions concerning those Tribunals’ Awards, it can be estimated that
unlike traditional “state of necessity” cases in public international
law, investment tribunals will begin to adopt the proportionality analysis in treaty-based arbitrations.
Conclusion
In international law, some concerns regarding human rights or
preservation of the environment relevant to the international community or public of the States have become more and more influential.
Therefore, eminent scholars and arbitral tribunals have taken different positions in various cases. In the history of international law,
from very first case to nowadays, respondent States have been tried to
justify their internationally wrongful acts by an assertion that they
committed such actions for the protection of their essential interests.
For that reason, international courts and tribunals have scrutinized
necessity defenses of respondent States in many cases. Except for a
few cases, international judicial bodies mostly have rejected the necessity defenses because of its strict requirements under the customary law which had been codified in the “Article 25 of the ILC Draft
2001.”
The necessity defense has a higher threshold than the public interest defense for its acceptance. It is understandable because the
“state of necessity” is a condition which precludes the wrongfulness
of an action made by respondent State; nevertheless, “public interest”
is a classical argument of States in cases of expropriation of alien investors’ properties and that argument is especially meaningful in indirect expropriations. In the last years, the “public interest” argument
came to the forefront under its different appearances in the investment arbitrations. Besides the preservation of interests of the international community in related disputes which have environmental or
human rights matters, protecting host States’ population through the
regulations of the governments has come into question commonly before the investment tribunals. Another dimension of the “public interest” concept is also remarkable. Accordingly, it has a key role in the

240. Id. at 75. See also Cynthia C. Galvez, “Necessity,” Investor Rights, and State Sovereignty for NAFTA Investment Arbitration, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 143, 151-52 (2013).
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transparency endeavor of the proceedings. It also constitutes a basis
for the third-party submissions which is known as amicus curiae.
From the perspective of the economic analysis of law, noneconomic factors must be excluded from the proceedings of the investment disputes unless there is an existence of the explicit provision in a treaty or an agreement. Accordingly, this approach prioritizes the protection of investments and leave the environmental or
humanitarian consideration aside; it also does not support the doctrine of “margin of appreciation.” However, in the considerable number of tribunal decisions, environmental or human rights matters have
been taken into consideration. Furthermore, numerous scholars have
not embraced the idea of the exclusion of non-investment factors in
the investor-State arbitrations.
Deference of the regulation power of governments has substantial importance in decision-making, but adoption of the doctrine of
“margin of appreciation” to the investment disputes, features some
risks. The main risk concerning the adoption of that doctrine is it may
cause unbalance between the weight of the public interest of host
States and foreign investors’ rights, along with their legitimate expectations. At this stage, the importance of the proportionality principle
in investment disputes must be remembered. In the different areas of
international law, the proportionality can play its role in the disagreements as a treaty provision, exercise of “customary international
law” or a “general principle of law.” Throughout international law,
proportionality can play its role in disagreement in a treaty provision,
exercise of “customary international law” or a “general principle of
law.” Thus, such a tribunal would find a balance between investor’s
rights and a host State’s interests, as well as it may preserve the legitimacy of the investor-State arbitration system through stabilizing
each parties’ benefits.
At last, it must be underlined that regarding the relationship between the “state of necessity” and the “principle of proportionality”
which the “state of necessity” does not require a proportionality analysis. Customary international law proves that fact. However, “NPM
clauses” in the BITs requires the proportionality analysis for the equilibrium between vital interests of the States and protection of the foreign investments. Therefore, in several cases, ad hoc annulment
committees draw attention to the separability of necessity requirements and the NPM provisions in the BITs. Thus, the committees an264
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nulled the awards since the tribunals did not review the applicability
of “state of necessity” under the “customary international law” and
the “NPM clauses” in the BITs separately.
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